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THE DILEMMA FOR FUTURE COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGIES: How TO CONSTITUTIONALLY DRESS
THE CRYPTO-GENIE1
Jason Kerben
"The proliferation of encryption of technology threat-
ens the ability of law enforcement and national security
officials to protect the nation's citizens against ter-
rorists, as well as organized criminals, drug traffickers
and other violent criminals."2
"If the freedom of the press . . . [or freedom of speech]
perishes, it will not be by sudden death . . . It will be a
long time dying from a debilitating disease caused by a
series of erosive measures, each of which, if examined
singly, would have a great deal to be said for it."3
The preceding two statements epitomize the
enduring struggle that has pitted the law enforce-
ment community against those who are con-
cerned with protecting their privacy interests.
The expanded use of advanced technologies in
communications has propelled the cryptography
debate into the spotlight.
Cryptography uses codes to create secret com-
I The term "crypto-genie" was apparently first used by au-
thor Steven Levy in 1994. Philip Elmer-Dwitt, Who Should
Keep the Keys?, TIME, Mar. 14, 1994, at 91.
2 Judy Fahys, Cryptic Coding: Export Quarrel Touches Utah
Coding: Conflict About Sales and Spies, SALT LAu TRIB., Jan. 28,
1996, at F2 (quoting James Cavanaugh, NSA's deputy direc-
tor of public policy).
3 Yale Broad. Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 606 (1973) (quot-
ing Lord Devlin).
4 Cryptography is defined as "the science or study of the
techniques of secret writing; especially coded cipher systems,
methods and the like." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 485 (2nd ed. 1987).
5 The "Caesar Cipher" adds a number to the position of
each letter to the alphabet. If you were to add three to A, the
first letter, it would then become D, the fourth letter; C be-
comes F, and so on. SeeJeff Prosise, How To Keep It A Secret;
Data Encryption Methods And How They Work, PC MAC., July
1994, at 315. The Egyptians and Phoenicians were the first
known groups of people to utilize cryptography. Edward
Radlo, Legal Issues in Cryptography, COMPUTER LAWYER, May
1996, at 1.
6 Lance Hoffman, CRYPTOGRAPHY- POLICY AND TECHNOL-




9 Id. The most common form of key generation in asym-
munication.4 This system of communication has
been used throughout history. One of the earliest
known examples of cryptography was used by Ju-
lius Caesar when he sent military messages to his
armies.5 Most cryptographic system have two
basic functions: encoding and decoding.6 The en-
coding function converts the normal data com-
monly known as "plaintext" into incompre-
hensible data commonly known as "ciphertext."7
The decoding function reverses the process, by
changing the "ciphertext" back into "plaintext."
In order to perform these functions, a sequence
of bits, or "keys" must be obtained by the sender
and receiver of each message.9 The strength of
the coded communication is greatly dependent
upon the length of the key.' 0 This system is an
metric cryptography is for an individual to choose two secret
100-digit prime numbers and multiply them together. The
200 digit product reveals the individuals "public key." The
private key, the original prime numbers, remain unknown
and cannot be determined by the knowledge of the public
key. The strength of the keys comes from the fact it is "com-
putationally infeasible" for a modern top-speed supercom-
puter to determine the factors of a 200-digit number in any-
thing less than several centuries. See James Fallows, Open
Secrets, ATLANTIC, June 1994, at 48. An example of the use of
asymmetric cryptography will be discussed in Part I. For a
more in-depth discussion of key generation with respect to
the different forms of cryptography, see the following publi-
cations. See Mitchell Moore, The Role of Cryptography in Network
Security, Bus. COMM. REv., Sept. 1995, at 67; Dave Trowbridge,
Public-key Crypto Gives Pyivacy Power to the People, COMPUTER
TECH. REv., Apr. 1995, at 7.
10 Hoffman, supra note 6. As a recent paper on cryptog-
raphy asserts that "[t]he sizes of encryption keys are mea-
sured in bits and the difficulty of trying all possible keys
grows exponentially with the number of bits used. Adding
one bit to the key doubles the number of possible keys; ad-
ding ten increases it by a factor of more than a thousand."
Matt Blaze, Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers to Provide
Adequate Commercial Security (visited Oct. 12, 1996) <http://
www.cdt.org/crypto/>. Therefore, in the case of DES, a 56
bit key, over 72 quadrillion (72,057,594,037,927,936) differ-
ent possible keys exist. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the
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example of symmetric or conventional key cryp-
tography. In order for this system to function
properly, both the sender and receiver must know
the key.
Even though cryptography has been present
since the time of Caesar, it has been effectively
kept from the American public by the National
Security Agency (NSA)." Officially, the agency
was charged with the duties of monitoring and de-
coding any signal transmission relevant to na-
tional security.' 2 Soon after its existence, NSA
took substantial steps to control the growth of
cryptography.3 In fact, NSA went so far as to say
that it had the "sole authority to fund research in
cryptography."' 4 For the most part, the claim, has
proved to be true, although it lacks legal validity.
That is, up until now. With the advancement and
growth of the Internet, NSA's claim of sole au-
thority has become somewhat overshadowed.
In the mid 1960's, the Department of Defense's
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) be-
Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143
U.Pa.L.Rev. 709, 736 (1995). A 128 bit key has over 40 sextil-
lion possible keys. Id. at 889.
11 On October 24, 1952, President Truman sent a memo-
randum to Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of
Defense Robert Lovatt authorizing the existence of NSA and
placing it under the authority of the Secretary of Defense.
Eleven days later, NSA came into existence. At the time of its
creation, there were no press announcements, no news cov-
erage and no Congressional debate. The number of people
who work for NSA and the size of its annual budget was and
continues to remain classified. Therefore, the agency was
often referred to as the "No Such Agency." A Clipper Primer,
COMPUTER FRAuD & SECURITY BULL., May 1994, at 13; see also
Maureen Harrington, Cyber Rebel, DENVER PosT, Mar. 5, 1996,
at 24. This publication, without listing its authority, reported
that NSA spends one million dollars an hour and eight bil-
lion dollars a year on eavesdropping around the world. Id.
12 John Perry Barlow, Decrypting the Puzzle Palace, COMM.
OF THE ACM,July 1992, at 25. The current deputy director of
NSA, William Crowell, has stated in a declaration that the two
missions of NSA are: (1) to conduct the signals intelligence
(SIGINT) activities of the United States Government; and (2)
to carry out the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense
concerning the security of the United States national security
information systems. See Declaration of William Crowell at 2,
Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp 1, (D.C. Cir.
1996) (No. 95-1812). One former Army intelligence officer
stated that "SIGINT is more valuable than dope because it
goes directly to the personal power and prestige of the Presi-
dent." David Stipp, Techno-Hero or Public Enemy, FORTUNE,
Nov. 11, 1996, at 180.
13 NSA has attempted to control the growth of private
cryptography by relying on the Computer Security Act, which
allows for military intelligence agencies' control of the civil-
ian cryptography market. See Henry King, Big Brother, The
Holding Company: A Review of Key-Escrow Encryption Technology,
21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 224, 248-49 (1995). The
gan experimenting with the idea of establishing a
computer network to be used for the furtherance
of academic research.15 The concept became re-
ality in 1969, when computers at the University of
California of Los Angeles and SRI International in
Menlo Park, California were linked and the
ARPANET was established.' 6 In 1984, ARPANET
split into two networks, one of which is now
known as the Internet. 7 As of 1996, there were
an estimated 30 million users of the Internet
worldwide. Is The impact of this figure is more
significant when one realizes the fact that the In-
ternet is growing at a rate of approximately ten
percent per month.19 Because of the growing reli-
ance on the Internet for business transactions and
personal communications, the need for a debate
on the open architecture and privacy of the net-
work has become tantamount.
Currently, a U.S. citizen or U.S. corporation
may domestically use any form or strength of en-
cryption it chooses.20 The knowledge of encryp-
Computer Security Act of 1987 can be found at Pub.L.No.
100-235, 101 Stat. 1724. NSA has also been instrumental in
the development of civilian cryptography and has also at-
tempted to establish universal cryptography standards. See
Renae Angeroth Franks, The National Security Agency and Its
Interference with Private Sector Computer Security, 72 IOWA L.REv.
1015 (1987). NSA has also "dispatched FBI agents on break-
in missions to snatch code books from foreign facilities in the
United States and CIA agents to recruit foreign communica-
tions clerks to buy their code secrets." Scott Shane, Rigging
the Game, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 10, 1995, at 8A.
14 David Burnham, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER STATE 39
(Random House, 1983). In 1975, NSA tried to stop all dis-
bursing of National Science Foundation grants for cryptogra-
phy research. KennethJ. Pierce, Public Cryptography, Arms Ex-
port Controls, and the First Amendment: A Need for Legislation, 17
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197, 203 (1984).
15 Marie A. Wright, Protecting Information from Internet
Threats, COMPUTER FRAUD & SECURITY BULL., Mar. 1995, at 7;
see also Cheryl Ajluni, Security Techniques Ensure Privacy, ELECT.
DESIGN, Apr. 17, 1995, at 83.
16 Wright, supra note 15.
17 Deborah Russel, COMPUTER SECURITY BASICS 211
(1991).
Is Larry Lange, Net Battleground Awaits Microsoft Salvo,
ELECTRONIc ENGINEERING TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996, at 22.
19 Edward Baig, Ready to Cruise the Internet?, Bus. WK.,
Mar. 28, 1994, at 180.
20 However, this use is restricted primarily to domestic
use. The one exception to non-domestic use is contained in
a recent amendment to 22 C.F.R. § 123 (1996). The limited
exception allows for temporary export for personal use, but
also establishes that the when the product is not in posses-
sion of the exporter that it should be "lock[ed] . . . in a hotel
room safe." 22 C.F.R. § 123.27(a) (3) (ii) (A) (1996). The ex-
porter must also provide a "record of that temporary export
and subsequent import." Id. at (b).
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tion technology may also be distributed domesti-
cally to other U.S. citizens without restriction.
However, if one chooses to export this technology
then he or she faces serious criminal penalties.2 1
In the past, a key length of fifty bits is the maxi-
mum one is able to export without a license from
the Department of State.2 2 On January 1, 1997,
however, this limit will be raised to a maximum of
fifty-six bits as long as the exporting company
commits "to explicit benchmarks and milestones
for developing and incorporating key recovery
features into their products and services."23 At
the end of a two-year period, only those compa-
nies that have established a key recovery system
and have provided a copy of the keys to a trusted
third party will be permitted to export fifty-six-bit
key cryptography. 24 Companies and individuals
that do not participate in the "key recovery" sys-
tem will not be permitted to export their crypto-
graphic products.25 Violation of these restrictions
is a criminal offense, punishable by imprison-
ment.26
The argument advanced by the government
and law enforcement officials is that strong en-
cryption export regulations are necessary in order
for law enforcement authorities to adequately ac-
complish their job. Recently, FBI Director Louis
Freeh testified to a Congressional committee that
"encryption capabilities available to criminals and
terrorists endanger future usefulness of court-or-
dered wiretaps."27 The proposed law enforce-
ment solution comes in the form of "socially re-
sponsible encryption products . . . which permit
timely law enforcement and national security ac-
cess and decryption."2
The line that separates law enforcement from
21 The violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA)
or the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) is
punishable by a fine up to $1,000,000, or imprisonment of
up to ten years, or both. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1994); 22
C.F.R. § 127.3 (1996). Any person that knowingly violates
the Export Administration Act (EAA) or the regulations of, is
subject to a fine of up to five times the value of the exports
involved or $50,000 whichever is greater, or imprisonment of
up to five years or both. 50 U.S.C. § 2410(a) (1994). Any
person that willfully violates the EAA or the regulations of, is
subject to five times the value of the exports up to $1,000,000
($250,000 for an individual), or up to ten years of imprison-
ment, or both. 50 U.S.C. § 2410(b) (1) (A) (B). The applica-
tion of these regulations will be discussed in some detail in
the text.
22 See 57 Fed. Reg. 32,148 (1992); see also Dorothy Den-
ning, Decoding Encryption Policy, SECURrIY MGMT., Feb. 1996, at
59. Note that Executive Order 13026 gives jurisdiction to the
Commerce Department. Exec. Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed.
private individuals and corporations is clearly de-
fined. Law enforcement is concerned with losing
its ability to effectively and timely conduct eaves-
dropping; while individuals are concerned with
privacy, freedom of speech and the potential lost
revenues. The line between those two is the First
Amendment. The First Amendment, which states
that no law shall be made that abridges the free-
dom of speech or of the press,29 holds the "keys"
to resolving this debate.
This paper discusses the government's legiti-
mate concern for national security which has
been exhibited through its past attempts and con-
tinues through its future intentions of regulating
the export of cryptography and addresses the con-
stitutional problems posed by these concerns.
Recognizing this dilemma, this paper presents a
viable solution that meets the needs of all inter-
ested parties without compromising a majority of
their ideals and objectives. Part I provides a brief
overview of the modern development and expla-
nation of the process of encryption. Part II dis-
cusses the regulations and policies that govern the
government's efforts in controlling the growth of
encryption software through export regulations.
Part III discusses the interests and policies of indi-
viduals and the business community in the en-
cryption debate. Part IV examines the three en-
cryption cases that have challenged the
government's export regulations on First Amend-
ment grounds. Part V presents a First Amend-
ment analysis of encryption source code as
speech. Finally, in Part VI, this note presents a
possible solution for dealing with the crypto-ge-
nie, while at the same time, meeting the needs of
the law enforcement, individuals, corporations
Reg. 58,767 (1996).
23 Statement of the Vice President, Al Gore, CONGRES-
SIONAL PREss RELEASE, Oct. 1, 1996. A key recovery system
would allow "a trusted [third] party to recover the user's con-
fidentiality key for the user or for law enforcement officials
acting under proper authority."
24 Exec. Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767 (1996).
25 Id.
26 See supra note 21.
27 Wayne Madsen, Securing Access and Privacy on the In-
ternet, COMPUTER FRAUD & SECuRrrY BULL.,Jan. 1, 1996, at 12.
The Director made the statement on May 3, 1995 to the
House Judiciary Committee.
28 Impact of Encryption on Law Enforcement and Public Safety,
Hearings on S. 1587 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of
Louis Freeh, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
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and most importantly the First Amendment of the
Constitution.
I. THE CRYPTO-GENIE AWAKENS
As previously discussed, symmetric encryption
has been around since the time of Caesar.30 This
system provides a means to communicate in se-
cret, but it also creates several problems. One of
these problems is key management. To best ex-
plain the obstacles that are experienced by using
this system, the next section will provide an exam-
ple involving two fictitious individuals who wish to
communicate by using encryption techniques.31
Sam (the sender) wishes to send his friend
Ruth (the receiver) a personal message. Sam
types his message into the computer as plaintext
and then uses a previously agreed upon key to en-
code the message into ciphertext. Sam then
sends the message to Ruth. Once Ruth receives
the message in ciphertext form, she uses the pre-
viously agreed upon key to decode the message
into plaintext. At this point, Ruth is able to read
her personal message.
One traditional problem that exists with this
system is the uncertainty as to whether the sender
is actually the person he says he is. Applied to this
specific example, how does Ruth in fact know the
message is from Sam and not from someone act-
ing as Sam? Once the key becomes known to any
other party, the entire security of any message
utilizing the key will be compromised.32 The
other problem this system poses is key manage-
ment. If this was the first communication be-
tween the two parties, how does Sam tell Ruth
what the key is without compromising the security
of future messages? Even if Sam is successful, by
telling her in person, the problem still exists if he
wishes to change the key in the future or if by
30 Edward Radlo, supra note 5, at 1.
31 Variations of this example have been used to explain
the inner-workings of cryptography. See Froomkin, supra
note 10, at 890-91.
32 This problem is known as key identity or authentica-
tion. One method that has dealt with this problem in the
past is by distributing the keys by physically secure means.
An example would be a bonded courier. This example illus-
trates the geographic problems that exist with the use of a
worldwide network. See Moore, supra note 9, at 71.
33 With this system of encryption Sam is limited in his
freedom to change his keys with Ruth or developing a system
with future parties. In either the case of a key that has been
compromised with an existing party or the establishment of
a key with a new party, Sam has no secure means of commu-
chance he wishes to communicate with another
party besides Ruth.3 3 These key problems of the
symmetric system, together with NSA's domina-
tion of the development of encryption technolo-
gies, created an environment where the use of en-
cryption was underutilized.
In 1975, Whitfield Diffie made a historic discov-
ery that forever changed how encryption is
viewed. Whitfield, a computer scientist and cryp-
tographer, has always been "concerned about in-
dividuals, an individual's privacy as opposed to
Government secrecy."3 4 Diffie's discovery made
was necessitated by his realization that a perfect
system would eliminate the need for a trusted
third party.35 Diffie developed a way to secure the
message using two mathematical keys by splitting
up the cryptographic key. The system known as
public key cryptography or asymmetric cryptogra-
phy utilizes a public key and a private key.3 6 Each
party, has a private key which only the owner
knows and a public key which everyone knows.
Whatever is scrambled by one key, can be un-
scrambled by the other key. For an explanation
on how this system functions, we will revisit Sam
and Ruth.
Sam completes a message to Ruth in plaintext
form. Upon completion, Sam encodes the
message with Ruth's public key. When Ruth re-
ceives the message in ciphertext from Sam, she
uses her private key to decode the message into
plaintext. To send a message back to Sam, Ruth
encodes her message with the use of Sam's public
key. Sam then uses his private key to decode the
message. The knowledge of one half of a key does
not in any way compromise the identity of the
other half.3 7 Therefore, the problem of key man-
agement is resolved, eliminating the need for the
trusted third party.
The problem of key identification was also elim-
nicating the key, other than personally contacting the party.
34 Steven Levy, Battle of the Clipper Chip, N.Y. TIMES, June
12, 1994, at 47.
35 Id. The "trusted third party" that Whitfield Diffie re-
ferred to was an individual or service utilized in symmetric
encryption systems whom provided key management to send-
ers and receivers by providing them with the keys. In the
earlier example of Sam and Ruth, a trusted third party would
provide Ruth with a secure key to decode messages from
Sam. Whitfield Diffie was concerned that if the trusted third
party was served with a subpoena they would simply "sell you
out." Id.
36 Id. at 47-48.
37 See Hoffman, supra note 6.
[Vol. 5128
FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES
inated by the asymmetrical process.38 The pro-
cess of authentication or digital signatures could
be achieved by reversing the process of encoding.
Once again, Sam and Ruth will serve as an exam-
ple of how the process of authentication works.
In the previous message, Sam encodes a part of
the message he wishes to serve as authentication
of his identity with the use of his private key. He
then encodes the rest of the message with Ruth's
public key. Upon receiving the message, Ruth be-
gins by decoding the message using her private
key to decode the entire message. She then uses
Sam's public key to decode the section of the
message in order to prove the authentication of
Sam as the sender. At no time throughout this
process have either of the private keys been com-
promised.
In 1977, three inventors Ronald Rivest, Adi
Shamir and Leonard Adleman (known as R.S.A.)
developed a system which utilized Whitfield Dif-
fie's process of encryption.39 The R.S.A. system is
based on prime number generation, since it is
computationally much more difficult to factor two
large prime numbers than multiplying them.40
Some of the companies that utilize RSA technol-
ogy include: Apple, AT&T, DEC, IBM, Lotus,
Microsoft, Northern Telecom and Novell.41 As of
January 1994, over two million instantiations of
RSA have been distributed in the United States,
and that number is expected to double by the end
of 1995.42
The use of public key cryptography was rela-
38 Asymmetric is defined as "not identical on both sides
of a central line, unsymmetrical; lacking symmetry." RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE at 129 (2nd
ed. 1987).
39 Anthony Watts, Cryptography is Key to Securing Proprietary
Information, EDN, July 6, 1995, at 101.
40 See Id. The. author provides an example of the mathe-
matical equation. First, you select two very large prime num-
bers, P& Q and another number d which is relatively prime
to (P-1) * (Q-1). Second you calculate e from the equation
e*d'=1 [mod ((P-1) * (Q-1))]. The pair of numbers (e, N)
where N is congruent to P*Q is the encryption key; the pair
of numbers (d, N) is the decryption key.
41 Susan Landau, Crypto Policy Perspectives, COMM. OF THE
ACM, Aug. 1994, at 116.
42 Hoffman, supra note 6.
4s Traps doors have a weakness in the key part of the en-
cryption algorithm which allows for the holder of such infor-
mation to use "computational shortcuts to break the code."
Froomkin, supra note 10, at 736-37. One example is allowing
for the holder of the information to simply multiply large
prime numbers together verses factoring a large number who
can only be factored by two numbers. Id. at n.112.
44 Stanley Holmes, Pretty Good Predicament, PC WK., July 3,
tively unknown to a vast majority of the public un-
til Phil Zimmerman appeared in 1991. The Sen-
ate was proposing an anti-crime bill that included
a provision that would require manufacturers to
insert "trap doors"43 in their products to enable
the government to read encrypted messages.4
Phil Zimmerman, an information privacy advo-
cate, had recently created an encryption program
called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) that was, and
still is, considered a significant obstacle to law en-
forcement code-cracking efforts. 45 The program
uses several encryption methods, including RSA,
and uses 512-bit, 1,024-bit, 1,280-bit or 2,048-bit
keys.4 6 In a recent study, it was concluded that if
100 million personal computers with an operating
system of 100 Mhz with eight megabytes of RAM,
were devoted to decrypting a PGP-encrypted
message using the 1,024-bit key it would take
280,000 years to crack the code.4 7 Originally,
Zimmerman intended to market his product, but
due to a growing concern of possible government
intervention that might eliminate any market for
his new product, he changed his plans. Zimmer-
man quickly gave a number of free copies to his
friends.48 "The important thing, reasoned Zim-
merman, "was to get PGP out there while it was
still legal for people to get a copy - to inoculate
the body politic."49
Upon receiving PGP, one of Zimmerman's
friends commenced driving around for two hours
with a laptop and a modem and uploaded PGP
from public phones to bulletin boards with In-
1995, at A3.
45 John Markoff, Federal Inquiry on Software Examines P-i-
vacy Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1993, D3. The use of en-
cryption by a pedophile hampered the efforts of law enforce-
ment in a recent case in California. See Timothy Lennon, The
Fourth Amendment's Prohibition on Encryption Limitation: Will
1995 be Like 1984?, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849, 1852 n.6 (1995). How-
ever, it is unclear whether NSA is unable to crack PGP be-
cause of the secrecy that surrounds NSA.
46 Al Berg, Securing E-mail with Encryption, LAN TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1995, at 142; Douglas Marden, The Three Cs to Im-
proving UNIX System Security, ENT. Sys. J., Mar. 1995, at 90.
47 Trowbridge, supra note 9, at 10.
48 Homes, supra note 44.
49 Id. Zimmerman and other civil libertarians are quick
to point out that PGP has been utilized on at least two occa-
sions against oppressive governments. The first occasion oc-
curred when Burmese freedom fighters used PGP to keep
documents hidden from their government. The second oc-
casion took place when Zimmerman received a message from
an individual in Latvia that stated, "Let it never be, but if dic-
tatorship takes over Russia, your PGP is widespread from Bal-
tic to Far East now and will help democratic people if neces-
sary." See Levy, supra note 34, at 50.
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ternet connections.5 0 The fact that the encryp-
tion program was now on the Internet meant that
it was readily accessible to foreigners or exporta-
ble without a license. 5 ' What occurred next was a
fifteen month investigation led by the Depart-
ment of Justice in order to determine if Zimmer-
man should be indicted on federal charges. 5 2 As
a result of the Zimmerman affair, the govern-
ment's policy on Internet distribution remained
unclear. A statement by an assistant attorney gen-
eral that there is "no change in the law, no
change in policy. If you're planning on making
encryption available over the Internet, or other
means, better check with the State Department
first," did nothing but cloud the issue further.53
Zimmerman, undaunted by the government's
efforts, recently developed a program entitled
PGPphone, which uses the Blowfish algorithm. 54
With the development of the technology to make
voice phone calls over the modem, this program
encodes or rearranges the digital version of the
phone conversation and then decodes it on the
other end.55 This program, has been available on
the Internet for downloading and at publication,
56 there have been no announcements that the
50 Andrew Brown, Kings of the Wired Frontier, THE IN-
DEPENDENT, Apr. 30, 1995, at 16. Zimmerman has repeatedly
denied that he placed his program on the Internet.
51 The program is readily available outside the United
Stateswithout the approval of the U.S. Government. A Nor-
wegian web site, (visited Jan. 25, 1997) <http://www.ifi.uio.
no/pgp/download.shtml>, lists several alternate web pages
in other countries where the program may be downloaded.
The countries include: Australia, Austria, Germany, Italy, Ja-
pan, Mexico, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. A Finn-
ish web site boasts to provide the "PGP source code and bina-
ries" to any user without any approval necessary. See Second
Declaration ofJulia Kogan, In Support of Plaintiffs Reply to
Defendants' Opposition to the Motion for Preliminary In-
junction, Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F.
Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
52 The result of the investigation was announced on, Jan-
uary 11, 1995, where the Department of Justice summarily
announced that "the investigation has been closed," without
any further comment. (visited Jan. 25, 1997) <http://www.
eff.org/pub/Alerts/usatty-pgp_960119.announce>.
53 Government Drops Zimmerman PGP Prosecution, NEW-
SBYTES NEWS NETWORK, Jan. 12, 1996, at 2.
54 Product Bits: Zimmerman Goes for Phone Privacy Software,
TELECOMWORLDWIRE, Jan. 17, 1996, at 1.
55 Id. The use of this technology allows the callers to to-
tally bypass the long distance network. Some companies that
offer the service known as Internet Phone include: VocalTec,
Camelot, Quarterdeck and ITEL. For a further explanation
of this issue and a recent FCC petition which requests the
service to be discontinued; see ACTA's Petition for Declaratory
Ruling, Special Relief and Institution of Rulemaking, RM-8775
Department of Justice is investigating the mat-
ter.57
II. THE GOVERNMENT'S (POROUS) AIR
TIGHT BOTTLE
Up until October 1, 1996, cryptographic sys-
tems and equipment were considered a muni-
tion.5 8 As a munition, cryptography was subject to
the Arms Control Export Act (ACEA) which gives
the President the authority to designate certain
items as defense articles or defense services.59
The export of these designated items is controlled
by regulations under the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR) .6o The United States
Munitions List then forms the index of the items
designated as "defense articles."6 1 Defense serv-
ices are defined as the "furnishing of assistance
(including training) to foreign persons, whether
in the United States or abroad. . ."62and the "fur-
nishing to foreign persons of any technical data
controlled under this subchapter, whether in the
U.S. or abroad."6 3 Encryption software was classi-
fied as technical data because of its capability of
maintaining secrecy, 64 and also for its ability con-
(Mar. 4, 1996).
56 See Wendy Grossman, Innovations: Secretly Does It, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 2, 1996, at 26 (for further explanation of
PGPphone).
57 At publication, there were no announced Department
ofJustice investigations. This information was obtained by a
telephone call to the Department of Justice, an Internet
search and a Lexis/Nexis search.
58 On this date the Vice President Al Gore announced
the administration's intention to remove cryptographic sys-
tems from the Munitions List and place them under the juris-
diction of the Commerce Department. The Executive Order
signed by the President was signed on November 15, 1996.
Exec. Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767 (1996). A mu-
nition is restricted from being exported without a valid li-
cense, (e.g., a cruise missle or nerve gas).
59 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994).
60 22 C.F.R. § 120 (1996).
61 Id. § 121.1.
62 Id. § 120.9(a) (1).
63 Id. § 120.9(a) (2).
64 The definition of technical data includes "Software as
defined in 22 C.F.R. § 121.8(f) of this subchapter directly re-
lated to defense articles." Id. § 120.10(4). Section 121.8 de-
fines software as "Software includes, but is not limited to the
system functional design, logic flow, algorithms, application
programs, operating systems and support software for design,
implementation, test, operation, diagnosis and repair." Cryp-
tographic software, as aforementioned is on the USML at 22
C.F.R. § 121.1 (XIII) (b) (1), which states that "cryptographic
. . . software with the capability of maintaining secrecy or con-
fidentiality of information or information systems."
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cerning defense services. 65
On November 15, 1996, President Clinton
signed Executive Order 13026 which removed
cryptographic systems from the Munition's List. 66
The President then placed the jurisdiction of reg-
ulating the export of cryptographic systems under
the authority of the Commerce Department.67
Under the Commerce Department's applicable
regulations, cryptography would be considered a
dual-use commodity under the Export Adminis-
tration Regulations (EAR).68 However, the Exec-
utive Order specifically states that separate provi-
sions will be established to control "export and
foreign dissemination of encryption products."69
Therefore it is necessary to examine both the
ITAR and EAA regulations and procedures in or-
65 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(2) (1996).
66 Exec. Order 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767 (1996).
67 Id.
68 The initial determination that cryptography was a
dual-use technology was made in 1991 by the Coordinating
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls. See Susan Lan-
dau, Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S. Crypto Policy chap.
8 (visited Jan. 25, 1996) <http://info.acm.org/REPORTS/
ACM_CRYPTOSTUDY/_WEB/contents.html>. Dual-use is
defined as "items that have both commercial and military or
proliferation applications." 15 C.F.R. § 772 (1996). In fact,
the Department of Commerce does already regulate crypto-
graphic systems containing functions "generally limited to
purposes such as data authentication, password protection,
and access control." Draft Memorandum from Bruce W. Mc-
Connell and Edward J. Appel, Co-Chairs, Interagency Work-
ing Group on Cryptography Policy to All Interested Parties
23 (May 20, 1996). The EAR are administered by the Bureau
of Export Administration in the Department of Commerce.
The statutory authority for the EAR, the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1994), lapsed on Au-
gust 20, 1994. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 (1994). President
Clinton issued executive orders requiring that the EAR be
kept in force to."the extent permitted by law" under the In-
ternational Emergency Powers Act (IEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1701
(1994). See Exec. Order No. 12924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437
(1994); See 61 Fed. Reg. 42,527 (1996). The EAR was subse-
quently greatly revised and simplified. See 61 Fed. Reg.
12,714 (1996).
69 Exec. Order 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767 (1996). The
Executive Order states that the foreign availability exception
shall not apply, the Department of Justice shall be a voting
member on the Export Administration Review Board and
that appropriate controls may be established to "promote ...
the development of a key recovery management infra-
structure." Id. The establishment of separate procedures to
govern the forms of cryptography removed from the Muni-
tions List is consistent with the previous government actions.
On October 12, President Clinton transferred commercial
communication satellites and hot section technologies for
the development, production, and overhaul of commercial
aircraft engines from the United States Munitions List to the
Commerce Control List. Exec. Order No. Amend. 12,981, 61
Fed. Reg. 54,079 (1996). The separate procedures estab-
lished by Executive Order included a necessary majority vote
der to determine potential problems that exist, in
order to avoid them in the implementation of fu-
ture regulations.
Under the ITAR, when an applicant wishes to
export an article or service and doubt exists as to
whether the article or service is listed on the U.S.
Munitions List, the applicant must apply to the
State Department's Office of Defense Trade Con-
trols (ODTC) .70 The applicant must file a "Com-
modity Jurisdiction Request" (CJR) to determine
if a license is required. 71 If it is determined that a
license is required, then the applicant must regis-
ter with the ODTC. 72 Upon registration ap-
proval, the applicant must obtain a license from
ODTC and seek advance approval for each recipi-
from the Operating Committee to determine whether the
item is exportable. All other items must only be ruled on
solely by the Operating Committee's Chairperson, the Secre-
tary of Commerce. Id. This procedure is important to note
when one examines the defense oriented membership of the
Operating Committee. The Committee is composed of rep-
resentatives of the Departments of Commerce, State, De-
fense, Energy, and the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency
are also in attendance, but do not vote. Exec. Order No.
12,981, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,981 (1995). Shortly after the Execu-
tive Order, the Department of Commerce established its
own, separate procedures to govern the export of these two
items. Commercial Communication Satellites and Hot Sec-
tion Technology for Development, Production or Overhaul
of Commercial Aircraft Engines, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,540 (1996).
These rules amended the EAR to exclude the two items
"from the mandatory foreign availability decontrol or export
licensing provision of the EAR, and from Special Compre-
hensive License eligibility." Id. Further, each request would
be determined on a "case-by-case review" and only granted
export privileges if it was "consistent with U.S. national secur-
ity and foreign policy interests." Id. The factors that would
be examined by the Operating Committee are: (1) country
of destination; (2) ultimate end-users; (3) technology in-
volved; (4) specific nature of the end-use(s); and (5) types of
assurance against unauthorized use or diversion that are
given in a particular case. Id. at 54,541.
70 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(a) (1996).
71 Id. The Deputy Director of NSA recently testified that
all "[1]icense applications for the permanent or temporary
export of cryptographic products are forwarded by the State
Department to NSA "for an assessment of whether the ap-
proval of an export license could have a negative impact on
the national security interests of the United States. In mak-
ing this assessment, NSA considers several factors including
the sensitivity of the technology proposed for export, and the
declared end-user and end-use of the commodity. Declara-
tion of William Crowell at 4, Karn v. United States Dep't of
State, 925 F. Supp 1, (D.C. Cir. 1996).
72 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(b) (1996). The applicant is re-
quired to register as an "arms dealer." Bill Pietrucha, judge
Hears Arguments To Dismiss Encryption Case, NEWSBYTES, Sept.
23, 1996, at 4.
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ent of the article or service.73
In 1978, a Department ofJustice r~iemorandut
was written to a science advisor of President
Carter, reporting on the constitutional concerns
of the ITAR regulations.74 It was asserted that the
ITAR prohibitions on cryptographic ideas and in-
formation "amounted to an unconstitutional
prior restraint." 75 The two fatal flaws that the au-
thor cites are "the standards governing the issu-
ance or denial of licenses are not sufficiently pre-
cise to guard against arbitrary and inconsistent
administrative action; second, there is no mecha-
nism established to provide prompt judicial re-
view of State Department decisions barring disclo-
sure."76 The author also asserts that the argument
that the ITAR regulates conduct not speech,77 is
misplaced because "even a cursory reading of the
technical data provisions reveals that those por-
tions of the ITAR are directed at communica-
tion." 78
Interestingly enough, current members of the
Justice Department have ignored this point and
instead have argued that O'Brien does apply.79 In
summary, the memorandum asserted that the re-
quirement of a "prepublication review" of crypto-
73 In addition to the requirement of supplying the name
of each particular recipient, the applicant must also have the
following statement upon the bill of lading and invoice;
"[t]hese commodities are authorized by the U.S. Govern-
ment for export only to [country of ultimate destination] for
use by [end-user]. They may not be transferred, transshipped
on a non-continuous voyage, or otherwise be disposed of in
any other country, either in their original form or after being
incorporated into other end-items, without the prior written
approval of the U.S. Department of State." 22 C.F.R.
§ 123.9(b) (1996).
74 Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice
to Dr. Frank Press, Science Advisor to President Carter (May
11, 1978) (on file with the Department of Justice).
75 Id. at 5.
76 Id. at 10.
77 If the regulation affected speech, then the application
of the O'Brien test would be necessary. The O'Brien test arises
from a Supreme Court case that established a four part test
for determining when conduct reaches the level of speech,
and as such, is protectable by the First Amendment. O'Brien
v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
78 Memorandum from John M. Harmon, supra note 74 at
11, n.16.
79 The government argued that O'Brien applied in both
the Bernstein and Karn cases. Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 12-14, Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State,
922 F. Supp. 1426 (C.D.Cal. 1996); Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dis-
miss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 17-20,
Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
graphic information might meet first amendment
standards if the "necessary procedural safeguards"
were put into existence. 80 This memorandum
was affirmed by the Department of Justice as re-
cently as 1984.81 The 1984 memorandum also
warned that ITAR's prohibitions of "communica-
tions of unclassified information by a technical
lecturer at a university or to the conversation of a
United States engineer who meets with foreign
friends at home to discuss matters of a theoretical
interest," were forms of unconstitutional prior re-
straint. *82
Under the EAA, all regulated commodities are
placed on the Commerce Control List (CCL). "3
Items or technology is identified by the Secretary
of Defense in concurrence with Secretary of Com-
merce as subject to export controls via the CLL. 84
The CCL indicates whether and to what extent, a
commodity is controlled. Controls may be imple-
mented for national security, foreign policy, short
supply and other purposes. 85 Concerning na-
tional security, there are three possible options
available for the Secretary of Commerce to
choose from when designating an commodity on
the CCL.8 6 In regards to foreign policy, there are
80 Memorandum from John M. Harmon, supra note 74 at
17-18.
81 "We remain of the opinion ... the ITAR still present
some areas of potentially unconstitutional application, and,
moreover, that we cannot be certain whether existing case
law would be sufficient to narrow the range of application to
a constitutionally sufficient extent." Memorandum from
Larry L. Simms, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, Department of Justice to Davis R. Robinson,
Legal Advisor, Department of State at 14 (July 5, 1984). A
1981 DOJ memorandum also concluded that the ITAR regu-
lations were an unconstitutional form of prior restraint.
Memorandum from Theodore Olson, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't ofJustice to Wil-
liam B. Robinson, Office of Munitions Control, U.S. Dep't of
State at 202 (July 1, 1981).
82 Memorandum from Larry L. Simms, supra note 81.
This statement clearly reflects the issues surrounding Bern-
stein. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. 1426. In this civil action, which
will be discussed later in greater depth, the plaintiff is a grad-
uate student (has now since graduated and wishes to teach)
in mathematics, wishes to publish a mathematical paper on
algorithms. The State Department has denied all of his re-
quests to export his paper. Bernstein is currently suing the
government on First Amendment grounds.
83 50 U.S.C.S. § 2404(c) (1) (Law Co-op. 1996).
84 Id. at (c) (2). Failure to act byteither the Secretary of
Defense or President, within 20 days, leads to an affirmation
of the Secretary of Commerce's determination concerning
the item or technology. Id.
85 15 C.F.R. § 799.1(d)(1)(iii) (1996).




five options that the President, after consulting
Congress, 7 may choose from when imposing ex-
port controls under the CCL.8" An applicant
wishing to export a commodity contained on the
CCL must apply for a validated license.89 The ap-
plication requires extensive documentation"o and
is reviewed on a case-by-case basis.91 Within sixty
days after receipt of the license application, the
Secretary of Commerce shall formally issue or
deny the license.92 If a license for application is
denied the Secretary must state the statutory basis
and the policies that are furthered by the denial.93
Unlike the ITAR, the EAA establishes provides
an appeal process where license denials may be
reviewed by an administrative law judge.94 How-
ever, all determinations made by the administra-
tive law judge are reviewed by the Secretary of
(1) the export of such goods or technology is restricted
pursuant to a multilateral agreement, formal or infor-
mal, to which the United States is a party and, under the
terms of such multilateral agreement, such export re-
quires the specific approval of the parties to such multi-
lateral agreement; (2) with respect to such goods or
technology, other nations do not possess capabilities
comparable to those possessed by the United States; or
(3) the United States is seeking the agreement of other
suppliers to apply comparable controls to such goods or
technology and, in the judgment of the Secretary,
United States export controls on such goods or technol-
ogy, by means of such license, are necessary pending the
conclusion of such agreement.
50 U.S.C.S. § 2404(e)(2)(A)-(C) (Law Co-op. 1996).
87 50 U.S.C.S. § 2405(f)(1)(2) (Law Co-op. 1996) (stat-
ing that the President must consult specifically with the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
of the Senate before he may impose, expand or extend ex-
port controls).
88 The five options are:
(1) such controls are likely to achieve the intended for-
eign policy purpose, in light of other factors, including
the availability from other countries of the goods or
technology proposed for such controls, and that foreign
policy purpose cannot be achieved through negotiations
or other alternative means; (2) the proposed controls
are compatible with the foreign policy objectives of the
United States and with overall United States policy to-
ward the country to which exports are to be subject to
the proposed controls; (3) the reaction of other coun-
tries to the imposition, extension, or expansion of such
export controls by the United States is not likely to
render the controls ineffective in achieving the intended
foreign policy purpose or to be counterproductive to
United States foreign policy interests; (4) the effect of
the proposed controls on the export performance of the
United States, the competitive position of the United
States in the international economy, the international
reputation of the United States as a supplier of goods
and technology, or on the economic well-being of indi-
vidual United States companies and their employees and
Commerce who either affirms or vacates the deci-
sion.95 This ineffective judicial review combined
with ithe fact that all functions exercised under
the EAA are explicitly excluded from judicial re-
view and the protections of the Administrative
Act,96 causes ample concern of the possibility of
arbitrary and inconsistent administrative action.
One provision that could be easily abused in the
implementation of export controls of crypto-
graphic systems is the foreign availability excep-
tion.97 This exception allows the President to
place export restrictions on goods or technology
that are "available without restriction from other
sources outside the United States . . . [if] . . . the
absence of such controls would prove detrimental
to the foreign policy or national security of the
United States."9 8 The Director of the FBI and a
communities does not exceed the benefit to United
States foreign policy objectives; and (5) the United
States has the ability to enforce the proposed controls
effectively.
50 U.S.C.S. § 2405(b)(1)(A)-(E) (1996).
89 Id. § 2403.
90 15 C.F.R. § 772 (Supp. 1) (1996). Some of the infor-
mation that must be submitted include the ultimate con-
signee in the country of ultimate destination, an intermedi-
ate consignee in any intermediary in a foreign country who
participates as an agent, description for the end-use intended
by the ultimate consignee and computer performance as cal-
culated in Composite Theoretical Performance. Id.
91 50 U.S.C.S. § 2409(b) (1996).
92 Id. § 2409(f)(1).
93 Id. § 2409(f) (3) (A)-(C).
94 Id. § 2412(e). The ITAR expressly states that designa-
tion of items as defense articles or services is not subject to
judicial review.. 22 U.S.C.S. § 2778(h) (1996).
95 50 U.S.C.S. § 2412(e) (1996). As a result, the so-called
"judicial review" appears like simple window dressing. The
statute clearly states that the Secretary's decision is "final,"
leaving little doubt as to the weight of the administrative law
judge's determination.
96 50 U.S.C.S. § 2412(a) (Law Co-op. 1996).
97 50 U.S.C.S. § 2403(c) (Law Co-op. 1996). However, as
was with the case with other items recently transferred from
the United States Munitions List to the Commerce Control
List, the foreign availability exception will not be applied to
cryptography. This will undoubtedly present an even greater
threat to an individual's liberties. The export determination,
made by a defense oriented Operating Committee, will be
guided solely by the determination of whether it is consistent
with U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, re-
gardless of the availability of the item elsewhere.
98 Id. One concern shared within the intelligence com-
munity is that this exception will demand for their agencies
to provide sensitive information in order to refute claims of
foreign availability or overriding national security concerns
thereby exposing the abilities and objectives of highly classi-
fied missions. One example of this would be the case where
an applicant wishes to export a 90 bit key program to India.
The applicant asserts that India has 90 bit key generally avail-
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number of other intelligence officials contend
that the President would not be hard pressed to
utilize this exception.99
Regardless of the preclusion of judicial review,
the courts have recognized that "colorable consti-
tutional claims may be reviewed by the courts."100
Therefore, if licenses were denied on the basis of
"impermissible reasons" or in excess of the Secre-
tary's authority, the action would be reviewable by
the court.10 ' Another legal tool may also exist for
cryptographic exporters by relying on a prior de-
cision. Ordinarily, "where a determination made
in an administrative proceeding is to play a criti-
cal role in the subsequent imposition of a crimi-
nal sanction, there must be some meaningful re-
view of the administrative proceeding."' 0 2
However, the 9th Circuit refused to apply this
principle in regard to the EAA because the deci-
sion to control a commodity "does not involve the
defendant's individual rights and is not an ele-
ment of the criminal offense in the pending
case."10 3 This analysis applied to export control
of cryptographic systems, which involves first
amendment rights, most certainly promises a dif-
ferent result.
The classification of goods or technology on
the CCL is precluded from review, which if vio-
lated, will subject the individual to criminal sanc-
tions. The EAA's functions are explicitly ex-
cluded from judicial review and the protections of
the Administrative Procedures Act. 0 4 As shall be
able in this particular country. The intelligence community
would be forced to present evidence that India does or does
not have this capability, which may result in the release of
highly sensitive intelligence information. Interview with an
anonymous intelligence government official, in Washington,
D.C. (Oct. 11, 1996) (notes on file with ComMLAW CONSPEG-
TUS).
99 Director Freeh testified to Congress that the use of en-
cryption products "by a vast array of criminals and terrorists
to conceal their criminal communications and information
poses an extremely serious and, in my view, unacceptable
threat to public safety." And without the ability to promptly
decrypt encrypted communication the Director stated that
"[the Bureau] will not be able to effectively fulfill our mission
of protecting the American public." Impact of Encryption
on Law Enforcement and Public Safety: Hearings on S. 1587
Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion, 104th Cong. (July 25, 1996) (statement of Louis Freeh,
Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation) (visited Sept. 30,
1996) (available at <http://www.crypto.com>). The Deputy
Director of NSA testified that "if encryption is used by
criminals and other adversaries (e.g., terrorism) to help hide
their activities, the public safety of U.S. citizens, and citizens
of other countries, may be placed in jeopardy." Security and
Freedom through Encryption Act: Hearings on H.R. 3011
asserted later, the limitation of export cryptogra-
phy is a violation of one's First Amendment
rights. Therefore, the lack of a "meaningful re-
view" in the case of controlling the export of cryp-
tographic systems will not pass constitutional mus-
ter under existing EAA regulations.
As the new procedures governing the control of
export of cryptographic systems are developed it
is tantamount for the government to recognize
the widespread dissemination of encryption prod-
ucts throughout the world. A study conducted in
June of 1996 identified 532 foreign encryption
products originating from twenty-eight foreign
countries.105 The Internet, a worldwide accessible
system, has over thirty-five cryptographic pro-
grams available for download, all of which are
over the exportable limit of "40-bit keys."106 In an
attempt to demonstrate the absurdity in the
United States export restrictions, a witness, who
later testified before Congress, recently
downloaded of these programs from a FTP site. 0 7
The abundance of encryption products is evi-
denced by the fact that for as little as five dollars,
one can buy a "U.S. export restricted" encryption
program on the streets of Saint Petersburg, Rus-
sia.108
A. An Attempt to Plug the Leaks
On November 16, the Clinton Administration,
in an attempt to appease the needs of the com-
Before the House Judiciary Comm. 104th Cong. (Sept. 26,
1996) (statement of William Crowell, Deputy Director of
NSA).
100 United States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037, 1044 (9th
Cir. 1992), citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602-05 (1988)
(recognizing that if the Secretary abused his authority by de-
nying licenses arbitrarily, judicial review would not be pre-
cluded.)
101 Bozarov, 974 F.2d at 1044-45.
102 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1946).
103 United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1221 (9th
Cir. 1990).
104 50 U.S.C.S. § 2412(a) (Law Co-op. 1996).
105 David Balenson, Representative of Trusted Infor-
mation Systems Inc., Remarks at the Annual International
Cryptography Institute Conference (Oct. 26, 1996) (discuss-
ing report issued by the Software Publishers Association).
106 John Black, The Internet Export Control Gap - The Real-
ity vs. The Reality, EXPORT CONTROL NEWS,June 30, 1995, at 9.
107 Export Controls on Mass Market Software: Hearing
Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Eco-
nomic Policy, Trade and Environment, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
5-9 (1993) (statement of Ray Ozzie, President Iris Associates).
108 Barlow, supra note 12, at 27.
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puter industry, "unilaterally" 09 proposed a new
initiative to replace previous Clipper proposals.o10
The initiative, Clipper III, specifies that for the
next two years, industry will be permitted to ex-
port encryption products of up to fifty-six-bit key,
provided the industry makes a commitment to
work towards "developing and incorporating key
recovery features into their products and serv-
ices.""' The key recovery features allow for a
trusted third party to recover the user confiden-
tial key for the user or law enforcement with the
proper authorization." 2 At the end of the two
year time period, with a completion of a key re-
covery infrastructure,' 13 export of fifty-six-bit key
products not supporting the key recovery system
will not be permitted." 4
After the Clipper III proposal was announced,
eleven companies formed an alliance to develop a
"worldwide approach to strong encryption" that
would utilize a key recovery system." 5 Although
the alliance was quick to form, it does not appear
as if all the members of the alliance fully support
109 Both Senator Leahy and Senator Burns expressed dis-
pleasure with the fact that the administration had not con-
sulted with Congress before announcing the new initiative.
See Statement by Senator Leahy on Administration's Encryption Ini-
tiative, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 2, 1996, at NI; Burns Cautious on
Encryption Plan, CONGRESSIONAL PRESs RELEASES, Oct. 1, 1996.
110 The initiative has been touted as "new" by the admin-
istration, but one House Commerce Committee staff mem-
ber stated that the initiative was "key escrow warmed over,
and that's it." White House to Revive "Clipper" Wiretap Plan,
Bus. WIRE, May 18, 1996. The original Clipper proposal was
a NSA-developed, hardware-oriented, cryptographic device
that utilizes a symmetric encryption and decryption al-
gorithm called "Skipjack." Dorothy Denning, Clipper Chip will
Reinforce Privacy, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1994, at 20. The
Skipjack algorithm remains classified, "to protect the security
of the key escrow system," but the length of the key has been
stated at 64 bits software / 80 bits hardware. Statement by Press
Secretary for the White House, Apr. 16, 1993 (visited Jan. 25,
1997) <http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/wh-crypto-origi-
nal.announce>. All phones and modems equipped with the
"voluntary" Clipper Chip would provide secure encryption,
but with a built-in decryption capability, that allows author-
ized officials, with the cooperation of two other parties, to
decode the data. Dorothy Denning, The Case for the Clipper,
TECH. REv., July 1995, at 50. With the proper court authori-
zation, law enforcement agencies could obtain the keys from
the escrow agents and then would be able to decrypt the
message. In April of 1994, the government received a scare
concerning the security of the Clipper chip. The arrest of
double agent Aldrich Ames allegedly prompted a meeting in-
volving the CIA, FBI and NSA where it addressed the possibil-
ity that information concerning the Clipper had been sold to
the Russians. Spy Scandal Could Sink Clipper, DATA COMM.,
Apr. 1994, at 17. (information provided by Winn Scwartel, an
executive director of a security consultancy, who had spoken
with an individual who had attended the meeting). The
the proposal. In fact, the chief executive of RSA
Data Security Inc., called the government's an-
nouncement "disastrous."11 6  The manufacturer
of the most popular Internet browser, Netscape
Communications Corp., also warned that the plan
"would hinder the industry's ability to compete in-
ternationally."" 7 The Business Software Alliance
also pointed out that several issues have yet to be
resolved, including the definition of key recovery
system. 18
The carrot and stick approach taken by the gov-
ernment is seen by some industry officials as "ex-
tortion."' 19 For the companies that abide by the
government's wishes of developing a key recovery
infrastructure, they will be allowed to export at
their convenience; whereas companies that do
not take part in the development of a key recovery
system will be prohibited for exporting their en-
cryption products. 20 Individuals who wish to ex-
port encryption software, are completely ignored
by the government's proposal. Under the propo-
sal, at the end of the two year period, a student or
anonymous source was quoted as saying that if the Clipper
had been compromised then "the whole thing's over, and we
have to start from scratch." Id. Government officials that
were questioned about the meeting, neither confirmed nor
denied its existence. Id.
I1 Statement of the Vice President, Al Gore, CONG.
PRESs RELEASE, Oct. 1, 1996.
112 Id. The data recovery feature of the key recovery sys-
tem for the specific user is unnecessary and superfluous
based on the fact that "data recovery can be done indepen-
dently ... and in a more secure manner." Center for Democ-
racy and Technology, Preliminary Analysis of "Clipper III" En-
cryption Proposal (visited Jan. 25, 1997) <http://www.cdt.org/
crypto/clipperIII/clipperIII-analysis.html>.
113 It is unclear what will occur if industry is unable to
meet the fanciful demand of establishing a key recovery in-
frastructure in a two year time period.
114 Statement of the Vice President, Al Gore, CONG.
PRESS RELEASE, Oct. 1, 1996.
115 joint Press Announcement: High Tech Leaders join Forces
to Enable International Strong Encryption, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 2,
1996. The eleven companies are: Apple Computer, Inc.,
Atalla, Digital Equipment Corporation, Groupe Bull, Hew-
lett-Packard Company, IBM, NCR Corp., RSA, Sun Microsys-
tems, Inc., Trusted Information Systems and UPS.
116 John Markoff, IBM's Rivals Criticize U.S. Encryption
Compromise, INT'L. HERALD TRIB., Oct. 3, 1996, at 14.
117 Id. U.S. industry's concern stem from the fact that
competitor countries are not restricted by export regulations
and therefore are more attractive to consumers who value
unlimited security. Fahys, supra note 2, at Fl.
118 Encryption and Indecency; Administration Acts on 2 On-
Line Fronts, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Oct. 2, 1996, at 2.
119 Markoff, supra note 116.
120 Companies that do not take part in the key recovery
system will still be permitted to export encryption products
that are 40 bit keys and under.
1997] 135
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
teacher of encryption would be prohibited from
placing their encryption software or code upon
the Internet without first taking part in the gov-
ernment-mandated key recovery system.
Another concern that arises from the Clipper
III proposal is the issue of implementation on a
worldwide scale. Quite simply, why would a for-
eign government and foreign companies wish to
take part in a program that allows the U.S. to
eavesdrop when it is just as easy to buy more pow-
erful encryption software that prevents such an in-
trusion? Administration officials respond by as-
serting that foreign governments that want access
to U.S. encryption keys will apply to U.S. courts,
and when the U.S. government needs a foreign
country's encryption keys the reciprocal shall ap-
ply. 121 However, this answer only presents more
questions. What about countries that do not par-
ticipate? What about countries who have less pro-
tective laws than the U.S.? What about countries
that violate the procedures in the name of na-
tional security?
Another issue that is presented by the govern-
ment's proposal is the ability of criminals to sim-
ply encrypt on top of a legal encryption communi-
cation. This issue was raised throughout the
earlier Clipper proposals and the government's
stock answer has been and most likely will con-
tinue to be, "criminals need to communicate with
others nationally and internationally, including
not just criminal confederates but also legitimate
organizations such as banks."' 22 However, this
same official later listed several examples of how
121 See Encryption and Indecency; Administration Acts on 2
On-Line Fronts, supra note 118.
122 See Impact of Encryption on Law Enforcement and Public
Safety, supra note 28. However, this argument is less convinc-
ing when applied to terrorists who survive in large part from
isolating and hiding from all legal aspects of society.
128 The examples listed by the Director of the FBI were:
(1) In the Aldrich Ames spy case, where Ames was told
by his Soviet handlers to encrypt computer file informa-
tion to them; (2) In a child pornography case, where
one of the subjects used encryption in transmitting ob-
scene and pornographic images of children over the In-
ternet; (3) In a major drug-trafficking case, where one of
the subjects of one of the court-ordered wiretaps used a
telephone encryption device which frustrated the sur-
veillance; (4) Some of the anti-Government Militia
groups are now advocating the use of encryption as a
means of preventing law enforcement from properly in-
vestigating them.
Impact of Encryption on Law Enforcement and Public Safety, supra
note 28.
124 Security and Freedom through Encryption Act: Hearings on
H.R. 3011 Before the House Judiciary Comm. 104th Cong. (Sept.
"harmful" encryption was being utilized by
criminals. 12 3 In not one of the examples, was the
criminal communicating with a "legitimate organ-
ization." Another instance also serves as an exam-
ple of the misguided policy statements of the gov-
ernment. At a recent Congressional hearing
where the Deputy Director of NSA was asked
about the widespread availability of encryption
products on the Internet, he flatly contended that
"serious users of security products don't obtain
them from the Internet." 12 4 But only minutes
later, the Deputy Director discussed the extreme
dangers of PGP, an encryption program readily
available on the Internet, to the effectiveness of
the law enforcement.12 5 From these two exam-
ples, it is apparent that the government's main
concern is the development of a single govern-
ment accessible encryption standard.
B. Without the Clipper, "the government will
eventually become helpless to defend the
nation from terrorism and other threats"'26
The authority to conduct electronic surveil-
lance, or wire tap, originated from the 1968 Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.'2 7 Be-
tween 1978 and 1988, there were a total of 7,200
applications for electronic surveillance, of which
only 11 were denied. 128 In 1993, not a single wire-
tap request was denied.12 9 In 1994, the FBI and
NSA requested 576 warrants to eavesdrop on for-
eigners within the United States, none of which
were denied. 3 0 The FBI has stated that wiretap
26, 1996) (statement of William Crowell, Deputy Director of
the National Security Agency.
125 Id.
126 James Aley, How Not to Help High Tech, FORTUNE, May
16, 1994, at 100 (statement by Louis Freeh, Director of Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation).
127 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25, reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 237, 253 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510
(1994).
128 Denning, supra note 110. However, this might be at-
tributed to the higher requirments required of law enforce-
ment in applying for a wiretap.
129 Robin Hanson, Can Wiretaps Remain Cost Effective?,
COMM. OF THE ACM, Dec. 1994, at 15.
130 Scott Shane, National Security Agency: Catching Ameri-
cans in NSA's Net, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 12, 1995, at 15A. In
this type of instance the intelligence agency must gain ap-
proval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
which is solely composed of seven federal judges, appointed
to seven-year terms by the chief justice of the United States
Supreme Court. Of the 576 requests, all were granted by the
court. Id. Clearly when a message is encrypted above the
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surveillance from 1985 to 1991, has led to 7,324
convictions. 3 1 This last figure must be given lim-
ited value because it only serves as a rough esti-
mate, since it assumes that these convictions
would have been impossible without the wiretaps.
The average cost of conducting a wiretap, as of
1993 was $57,256.132 According to a recent FBI
study, the costs will soon increase seventeen
times 33 due to advances in technology, such as
fiber-optic cable and advanced call forwarding.134
As criminals and terrorists develop more sophisti-
cated illegal activities, through the use of ad-
vanced technologies, the continued effectiveness
of law enforcement's efforts to eavesdrop be-
comes critical.
With the expansion of the Internet, the govern-
ment has sought to protect their law enforcement
abilities by advancing particular cryptography
standards and influencing the debate.13 5 One ini-
tiative advanced by the government, the Clipper,
has continually been asserted as "voluntary."
However, in a recently declassified secret FBI doc-
ument entitled "Impact of Emerging Telecommu-
nications Technologies on Law Enforcement," it
was stated that a necessary goal was to "prohibit
cryptography that cannot meet the Government
standard. An exception will, of course, exist for
the protection of classified, national defense in-
formation." 3 6
Another recent declassified document pre-
pared by the FBI, NSA and DOJ stated that
"[tiechnical solutions, such as they are, will only
work if they are incorporated into all encryption
products. To ensure that this occurs, legislation
mandating the use of Government-approved en-
cryption products or adherence to Government
maximum limit and communicated to another country or
foreign embassy, then NSA has jurisdiction based on the fact
that there has been a violation of the ITAR by exporting with-
out a proper license. But in a recent interview with a govern-
ment official, it was unclear under what authority NSA has
authority when it conducts eavesdropping of foreigners who
communicate with the use of encryption within the United
States. Interview with an anonymous intelligence govern-
ment official, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 11, 1996) (notes on
file with the CommLAw CONSPECTUS).
131 Hanson, supra note 129, at 14.
132 Id.
'33 Id.
134 Dorothy Denning, Clipper Chip will Reinforce Privacy,
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1994, at 18.
15 See Froomkin, supra note 10.
136 Impact of Emerging Telecommunications Technologies on
encryption criteria is required."137 These memo-
randa have substantial support in a number of the
actions taken by the government. It is no secret
that the United States government has an enor-
mous market power that could be used to influ-
ence the development or implementation of
products. 3 8 For example, shortly before the in-
troduction of the Clipper I initiative, AT&T had
developed a new, low cost secure phone that was
designed with a nonexportable encryption al-
gorithm.139 After some consultations with NSA,
AT&T refitted their phones with the Clipper chip.
Immediately thereafter, the Justice Department
placed an eight-million dollar order with AT&T
for Clipper-based encoding devices. 140 The De-
fense Department is also believed to have ordered
20,000 chips.1 4 ' Just this year, AT&T announced
that it has developed a security chip to protect
data stored on computer disks, in cellular phones,
and television set-top boxes all of which will utilize
the Clipper chip. 142 With the simplicity of an Ex-
ecutive Order, the President could strongly rec-
ommend for all executive agencies to conduct
communications utilizing a key recovery system.
Any secure communication with a government
agency would then have to be conducted utilizing
the government accessible key recovery system.
This saturation would allow the government man-
dated key recovery system to become the de-facto
standard and destroy the concept of independent
encryption that does not support key recovery. In
fact, the former General Counsel of NSA recently
admitted that "l[t] he [government's] concern . . .
is the prospect that in five years . . . every phone
you buy that costs $75 or more will have an en-
crypt button on it that will interoperate with every
Law Enforcement (visited Jan. 25, 1997) <http://epic.org/
crypto/ban/fbi-dox/impact-text.gif>.
13 Encryption: The Threat, Applications and Potential Solu-
tions (visited Jan. 25, 1997) <http://epic.org/crypto/ban/
fbi-dox/mandatory.gif>.
138 The U.S. government is the largest purchaser of tele-
communication products in the world. Sean Flynn, A Puzzle
Even the Codebreakers Have Trouble Solving: A Clash of Interests
Over the Electronic Encryption Standard, LAW AND POLIcy IN
INT'L. Bus., Sept. 22, 1995, at 220.
139 Levy, supra note 34, at 7.
140 Edmund Andrews, U.S. Plans to Push Giving F.B.I. Ac-
cess in Computer Codes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1994, at Fl.
141 Murray Slovick, The Big Brother Chip: Clipper Data-En-
cryption Chip, POPULAR MECHANICS, Sept. 1994, at 117.
142 1995: Year in Review, MULTIMEDIA & VIDEODISC MONI-
TOR, Feb. 1, 1996, at 22.
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other phone in the country . . ."14 The question
then truly becomes, is voluntary really voluntary?
III. THE OTHER SIDE: INDIVIDUAL AND
INDUSTRY'S INTEREST IN THE
CRYPTO DEBATE
Unbreakable encryption is of interest to anyone
who uses the Internet to conduct affairs. A
number of recent events have attributed to a wave
of concern over the lack of secure communica-
tions. In September 1994, a group of hackers
penetrated the National Weather Service com-
puter network in Maryland, but were stopped
before any damage was done.' 44 If the hackers
had caused the weather service's computer to shut
down, then all commercial airlines, who are de-
pendent upon its information, would have been
grounded as a result.' 45 In October 1994, a six-
teen year-old hacker was arrested after breaking
into over 100 networked systems, including the
South Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute,
where it was acknowledged that he may have ac-
cessed some secret nuclear data.14 c Also, in Au-
gust 1996, hackers altered the Justice Depart-
ment's web site so that it read: "United States
Department of Injustice" and placed several swas-
tikas placed on the page.14 7
Legal testing of the protection afforded by en-
cryption devices also creates alarm. In early 1994,
after only eight months, a team led by Bell Labs,
working with 600 volunteers in twenty-four coun-
tries cracked a 129 bit key.148 Before the results of
143 Stuart Baker, General Counsel of NSA, Remarks at
the Fourth Annual Conference on Computers, Freedom and
Privacy, session entitled "Data Encryption: Who Holds the
Keys?" at the John Marshall Law School, Chicago (Mar. 24,
1994) (visitedJan. 25, 1997) <http://www.cpsr.org/dox/con-
ferences/cfp94/encpanel.html/>.
144 Joseph C. Panettieri, Are Your Computers Safe?, INFO.
WK., Nov. 28, 1994, at 34, 42.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 42, 46. In November 1994, an MCI employee
was charged with stealing 100,000 telephone calling card
numbers which were subsequently used to place $50 million
worth of long distance calls. Id. at 46. In February 1995, Ke-
vin Mitnick was arrested for stealing 20,000 credit card num-
bers and billions of dollars worth of corporate information by
tapping into electronic networks. Della de Lafuente, Loyola
U. Plays Role in Tracking Wanted Hacker, Cmi-. SUN TIMEs, Feb
17, 1995, at 49. In September 1995, a computer hacking ring
led by a Russian biochemistry student hacked into Citicorp's
$500 billion-a-day network and transferred $11 million into
their accounts and withdrew a total of 400 thousand dollars.
All Things Considered, NATIONAL PUBLIc RADIO, Sept. 16, 1995
this test, scientists had asserted that a 129 bit key
was uncrackable for forty quadrillion years.149 A
recent study conducted by cryptographers also
concluded that "uncrackable" keys did not ex-
iSt.1 5 0 With the use of a $200 Field Programmable
Gate Array (FPGA) chip, an individual could
crack a 40 bit key in 5 hours.' 5' With the re-
sources of $10 million, a 56 bit key could be pene-
trated in six minutes; with $300 million it would
only take twelve seconds. 152 The authors also
point out that these figures are not static since
computing power doubles every eighteen
months.153 Therefore, in the two year time pe-
riod established by the Clipper III proposal, this
figure will have more than doubled. At first
glance, these dollar figures might seem enor-
mous, but to many corporations and govern-
ments, they represent only a drop in the bucket.
The report concludes that in order to have ade-
quate protection for the next twenty years, a sys-
tem should use a key at least ninety bits long. 15 4
All of these cases illustrate the fragility of existing
electronic networks. Yet, the government contin-
ues to advocate the voluntary implementation of a
de-facto standard of encryption technology based
on key recovery in order to protect its law enforce-
ment capabilities.
A. Past Abuses in the Name of National
Security
Critics of governmental control of the encryp-
tion debate also express concern about the poten-
(transcript on file with ComMLAw CONSPECTUS).
147 Vandals Show justice's Vulnerability, DAYrON DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 24, 1996, at 11A.
148 Ellen Messmer, Bellcore Leads Team Effort to Crack RSA
Encryption Code, NETWORK WoRI , May 2, 1994, at 14. Even
more startling, was that the team leader asserted that the pro-
cess would have only taken eight weeks, had all of the com-
puters been in the same room.
149 Id.
150 Matt Blaze, supra note 10. The authors include Matt
Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, Ronald L. Rivest, Bruce Schneier,
Tsutomu Shimomura, Eric Thompson and Michael Wiener.
The paper focues only on symmetric crypto-systems and not
the asymmetric or public key crypto-systems. However, the
paper points out that public key crypto-systems "are subject
to shortcut attacks and must therefore use keys ten or more
times the lengths of those discussed here to achieve the an







tial for abuse. The government has repeatedly as-
sured the public that fears of escrow and recovery
abuse are unwarranted. It proposes safeguard
procedures, such as the requirement of a court
authorization, which would protect against any
form of abuse, from either the government or pri-
vate sector.155 However, if history is a reliable in-
dicator, there is genuine cause for concern.
During the '50s, the FBI identified 26,000 "po-
tentially dangerous" persons who would be
rounded up in the event of a national emer-
gency.15 6 The CIA, from 1953 to 1973, opened
and photographed 250,000 first class letters
within the United States in order to compile a list
of 1.5 million names.15 7 During the '40s, based
on illegal information provided by the Census Bu-
reau, 112,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry
were put in internment camps.' 58
While in office, President Kennedy ordered ille-
gal wiretaps of citizens, including a former FBI
agent and a newspaper reporter.15" As recently as
April 1996, several Social Security workers gave
confidential information on at least 11,000 people
to a credit card fraud ring, which resulted in at
least $330,000 in unauthorized charges.16 0 The
government asks the public to trust it with access
to the keys to all phone and data forms of com-
munication. Yet, based on the evidence of past
abuses, the creation of a system where such an in-
valuable prize can be claimed by the possessor of
this information, abuse and corruption in some
form, is certain.
B. An International Market That Must Be
Guided by an International Community
The business community expresses concern
155 See generally, Froomkin, supra note 10.
156 Id. at 732 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-755, pt. 2, at 4
(1976)).
157 Id.
158 Susan Landau, Crypto Policy Perspectives, COMM. OF THE
ACM, Aug. 1994, at 115, 119.
'59 Timothy Lennon, The Fourth Amendment's Prohibitions
on Encryption Limitation: Will 1995 be Like 1984?, 58 ALB. L.
REv. 467, 475 (1994) (quoting David Wise, The American Police
State: The Government Against the People at 66 (1978)).
160 Saul Hansell, U.S. Workers Stole Data on 11,000, Agency
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1996, at A6. Another example of
abuse occurred when in October 1992, over three hundred
employees of the Internal Revenue Service were identified as
using one of the computers to issue fraudulent refunds and
to browse through taxpayer accounts. U.S. CONGREss, OFFICE
OF Ti-CHNO.oGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRI-
that government-controlled encryption ignores
international market concerns. The computer
revolution has brought about numerous new and
innovative possibilities in helping to reshape our
society. One possibility that remains to be fully
discovered is electronic commerce. The develop-
ment of "cybercash" or international currency has
the potential of opening doors that were never
dreamed of being opened.' 6 ' With the capabili-
ties of the Internet and the concept of cybercash
protected by strong encryption, one could in-
stantly download a copy of the most recent book
in Bangladesh. However, without the security of
strong encryption, the distributor of the book
might as well put it on a bulletin board.
The fear of manipulation or duplication of
one's product has at least partially resulted in
abysmal sales of only $350 million over the In-
ternet, as compared with $53 billion spent on cat-
alog shopping.'6 2 The need for protection is evi-
denced by the abuse that is currently taking place
on the Internet. On one occasion, a student's
computer became a "swap shop".of copyrighted
software. The government estimates that in a very
brief period of time, a total of over $1 million
worth of copyrighted material was downloaded.'6 3
Entire texts of books have appeared on the In-
ternet,1 64 prompting numerous copyright con-
cerns. 65 Encryption could help producers to re-
ceive authenticated orders from consumers. They
then could fill the order by transmitting the en-
crypted product, which would be safe from ma-
nipulation, to the consumers. Existing technol-
ogy would provide protection against any
unauthorized duplication.
As of 1991, the encryption market in the
United States was $384 million. By the end of
VACY IN NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS, OTA-TCT-606 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Sept. 1994) at 3.
161 Net Profits, ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at 12.
162 Ken R. Wells, Transactions Over the Internet Safe Despite
Publicized Thievery, SAN DIEGO Bus. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at 15.
163 Nightline: Law and Order on the Information Superhigh-
way (ABC television broadcast, May 2, 1994) (report concern-
ing David LaMacchia, who established a computer bulletin
board which contained copyrighted software available for
download) (transcript on file with COMMLAW CONSPECTUS).
164 Carolina Saez, Enforcing Copyrights in the Age of Mul-
timedia, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER& TECH. L.J. 351, 381-82
(1995).
165 See generally, Dale J. Ream, Copyrighted Works & Com-
puter Networks: Is Protection Possible?, 4 KANSASJ.L. & PUB. PoL'Y
115 (1995); Kenneth D. Susan, Tapping to the Beat of a Digital
Drummer, 59 ALB. L. REv. 789 (1995).
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1996, that figure is estimated to climb to $946 mil-
lion.166 This figure is properly analyzed when
taken in conjunction with the fact that this ac-
counts for less than fifty percent of the total
worldwide encryption market.16 7 American man-
ufacturers place primary blame for the sizable for-
eign-market share on the existence of the restric-
tive export regulations placed upon U.S.
technology. Other countries, such as Japan, Rus-
sia, Germany, France and the U.K, produce and
export encryption of a fifty-six-bit key strength
and higher.16 3 Senator Leahy recently stated that,
"U.S. companies are not allowed to market glob-
ally the one encryption method that's used
around the world."1 69 Therefore, U.S. software
companies, must choose between what type of
lines to produce. A company could produce one
line at forty key bits which is exportable or a com-
pany could produce two different lines of the
same product, one which is exportable and the
other not. Due to the cost prohibitive nature of
maintaining two different lines of the same prod-
uct, most U.S. companies opt to produce one
weakly encrypted exportable line. The effects of
this policy have proven financially disastrous.
This backwards standard will cost U.S. software
companies $6 billion to $9 billion in annual reve-
nues.17 0 This figure is expected to rise to $60 bil-
lion in annual revenues by the year 2000.171
One computer company reported that it lost
sales of $70 million because it was not able to pro-
vide the encryption that its customers wanted.1 72
For the companies that choose to market two dif-
ferent lines, the results are the same. An example
of this occurred in France where a hacker using
two supercomputers and 120 workstations was
able to crack the non-U.S. version of Netscape.' 7 3
166 Hoffman, supra note 6.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 National Information Infrastructure Copyright Pro-
tection Act of 1995: joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciay and
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. 2441 and S. 1284, 104
Cong., 72 (1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
170 Fahys, supra note 2, at Fl.
171 Christine Hudgins-Bonafield, Will Spies Hold Your
Keys, NETWORK COMPUTING, Mar. 15, 1996, at 78, 79.
172 Aley, supra note 126, at 101.
173 Jeff Prosise, The Netscape Security Breach, PC MAG., Apr.
23, 1996, at 199, 200.
"4 Aley, supra note 126, at 100.
175 Hudgins-Bonafield, supra note 171, at 82.
176 Thomas Omestad, Cloak and Dagger as R&D, WASH.
A CEO of a computer company put it best when
he responded to a question concerning the Clip-
per by stating, "Why would an international com-
pany want the U.S. government to be able to
eavesdrop on them?" 174 The irony of the situa-
tion is further exemplified by the fact that three
out of ten Fortune 500 companies already rely on
stronger foreign encryption products.'7 5
Economic espionage resulting in the theft of
technology and trade secrets has become one of
the biggest concerns among the business industry.
A former CIA Director called this form of spying
"the hottest current topic in intelligence."17 6 Ex-
perts estimate that anywhere between $20 to $30
billion a year is lost by American business as a re-
sult of foreign and domestic spying.17 7 Out of the
twenty foreign governments that are often cited as
supporting campaign of economic espionage
against the U.S. business community, the most fre-
quently mentioned are France and Japan.17 8 In
the spring of 1993, the CIA obtained a list of tech-
nologies allegedly sought by France, naming forty-
nine manufacturers and twenty-six financial firms
and U.S. government laboratories and agen-
cies.' 7" Also in 1993, the FBI reported that its
caseload of industrial espionage increased from
ten to five hundred in a period of nine months. 0
NSA and other U.S. intelligence agencies have
been slow in taking any form of affirmative action
against the foreign governments, let alone ac-
knowledging the existence of the problem. This
inaction stems from the fact that the U.S. intelli-
gence agencies conduct many of the same activi-
ties, and wish to continue doing so. As a result,
U.S. businesses are being asked to continue mak-
ing sacrifices for the betterment of various law en-
forcement and intelligence agencies.181
POST, June 27, 1993, at C2.
177 Roderick P. Deighen, Welcome to Cold War II, CHIEF
EXECUTIVE, Jan./Feb. 1993, at 42.
178 France is considered the most "brazen perpetrator,"
by breaking into Paris hotel rooms of foreign executives and
bugging first-class cabin, on Air France. Japan's efforts are
largely coordinated by the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry, which obtains and analyzes vast amounts of
publicly-accessible commercial information for Japanese
companies. Omestad, supra note 176, at C2. One report esti-
mated that the Ministry's Trade Organization files a total of
10,000 pages a day on the companies, governments and
economies of the target countries as a "part of their normal
business routine." Deighen, supra note 177, at 45.
179 Omestad, supra note 176, at C2.
180 Id.
181 The export restriction placed upon industry does
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IV. THE THREE CRUSADERS FOR
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
ENCRYPTION
Just within the last few years the judicial branch
emerged as the forum for the cryptography de-
bate. Three individuals, who wished only to share
their encryption programs and ideas with the rest
of the world, have brought the government to
court. Their arguments are based primarily on
the assertion that the source code used for en-
cryption constitutes speech and therefore, should
be afforded First Amendment protections. The
government's response revolves around national
security concerns. The Director of FBI Counter
Intelligence, Edward Apell, recently stated that
the wide distribution of encryption in either the
form of a book or computer disk is a threat.18 2
However, this statement appears to be contradic-
tory to the government's position in Karn v.
United States Dep't of State.' 3
A. Phil Karn
In 1994, Bruce Schneier wrote a book entitled
"Applied Cryptography," which contained expla-
nations of how to build cryptography into prod-
ucts, illustrates cryptographic techniques, evalu-
ates algorithms and provides examples of some
algorithms. 1 8 4 On February 12, 1994, a friend of
Schneier by the name Phil Karn, a San Diego
software developer, wrote to the State Depart-
ment to ask whether a license-was required to ex-
have some exceptions. DES, 56 key bit encryption, is avail-
able for some banking and medical services. See King, supra
note 13 at 231. Recently, Health Online Service, was
awarded an export license of a 786 character encryption key
software. For Doctors Only, LINK-UP, May/June 1996, at 8.
182 Interview by Dan Charles with Edward Apell, Diector,
F.B.I. Counter Intelligence, All Things Considered, (National
Public Radio, Sept. 28, 1995). The pertinent statements were
made in response to questions concerning a book that con-
tained the whole PGP program. He stated, "[i]t is a source
code, it is a program. It instructs the computer. And if you
can scan it into the computer; if you can use it to tell the
computer what to do, then it is, in fact, a machine itself." Id.
183 Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
184 Bruce Schneier, Electronic Speech-for Domestic Use Only,
NETwoRK WORLD, Jan. 16, 1995, at 29.
185 ODTC Case: 038-94, Letter from Phil Karn, to Major
Gary Oncale, Office of Defense Trade Controls, Department
of State (Feb. 12, 1994). When Phil Karn was asked the rea-
son why he wished to export a book and disk he did not au-
thor he responded, "I see this as a good test case that shows
just how silly the rules are." Crypto Speech Case Heating Up,
port the book.185 One month later, a reply to the
CJ Request stated that the book was not subject to
the "licensing jurisdiction of the Department of
the State since the item is in the public do-
main."186 Since that time, the book has sold
25,000 copies in the United States and abroad. 8 7
On March 9, 1994, just seven days after ob-
taining approval from the State Department for
export of the book, Karn wrote to the State De-
partment to ask whether a license was required to
export a computer disk version of the same
book.'8 s The disk contained, line for line, the
same source code listed in the book.'89 Two
months later, the Office of Defense Trade Con-
trols concluded that the computer disk was sub-
ject to the licensing jurisdiction of the State De-
partment since it was determined that the
computer disk was a defense article.190 The same
individual that made the decision regarding the
export of the book stated that, "[t]he text files on
the subject disk are not an exact representation of
what is found in 'Applied Cryptography.' Each
source code listing has been partitioned into its
own file and has the capability of being easily
compiled into an executable subroutine." 91 The
distinction between the material in a book format
versus an electronic format was further justified
by the fact that it was of an "added value to the
end-user that wishes to incorporate encryption
into a product."192
The initial ODTC decision was subsequently ap-
pealed to the Secretary for Export Controls.'93
VOORHEEs REPORT, Dec. 9, 1994, at 3. This letter and all
other relevant letters and pleadings related to this proceed-
ing can be located at Phil Karn's web site: (visited Jan. 25,
1997) <http://www.qualcomm.com/people/pkarn/export/
186 ODTC Case: C 038-94, Reply Letter from William B.
Robinson, Office of Defense Trade Controls, Department of
State, to Bruce Schneier (Mar. 2, 1994).
187 Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., U.S. Laws Take Bytes From Se-
cret Code Book, Cm. TRIuB., June 8, 1995, at N24.
188 ODTC Case: Cf 081-94, Letter from Phil Karn, to Ma-
jor Gary Oncale, Office of Defense Trade Controls, Depart-
ment of State (Mar. 9, 1994).
189 Id.
190 ODTC Case: Cf 081-94, Reply Letter from William B.
Robinson, Director of Office of Defense Trade Controls, De-
partment of State, to Phil Karn (May 11, 1994).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 ODTC Case: 081-94, Appeal of Commodity Classifica-
tion from Phil Karn, to Dr. Martha Harris, Deputy Assistant




Karn argued that the alleged "added value" was a
flawed argument. He asserted that through the
use of optical character recognition (OCR) tech-
nology by scanning the text of chapter five of the
book onto a computer, the same material in the
exportable book was produced onto the
unexportable computer disk. The only difference
being the medium on which the material was
presented.19 4 Earn's arguments, however fell on
deaf ears and the initial decision was affirmed.'9 5
Karn then appealed the decision to the Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs at the Department of
State, where it was again affirmed.19
6  ,
On September 21, 1995, Karn advanced the ar-
gument that "the prior licensing requirement of
the ITAR operates as a prior restraint on Plain-
tiffs disclosure of ideas and information in viola-
tion of his First Amendment rights (sic) to free
speech" in a United States District Court.'9 7 He
reiterated the argument that there was no differ-
ence between the information on the book and
the information on the computer disk, other then
the medium itself.'98 Karn pointed out that the
computer disk also contained "comments" that
were not involved in the functioning program, in
addition to the source code, which was further ev-
idence of its "communicative purpose."' 99
. The government contended that "designation
of encryption software on the USML is unrelated
to any expressive value" 20 0 and the "crucial" gov-
ernmental interest of "national security," which
194 Id.
195 ODTC Case: 081-94, Reply Letter from Dr. Martha
Harris, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Controls, De-
partment of State, to Phil Karn (Oct. 7, 1994)
196 ODTC Case: 081-94, Letter from Kenneth C. Bass, III
and ThomasJ. Cooper, representing Phil Karn, to Thomas E.
McNamara, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Political-Mili-
tary Affairs, Department of State (Dec. 5, 1994). The deci-
sion was, ODTC Case: 081-94, Reply Letter from Thomas
McNamara, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Political-Mili-
tary Affairs, Department of State, to Phil Karn (June 13,
1995).
197 Complaint at 7, Karn v. United States Dep't of State,
925 F. Supp 1, (D.C. Cir. 1996).
198 Id. at 5.
199 Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dis-
miss or, in the Alternative, for SummaryJudgment at 10, 925
F. Supp.
200 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment at 34, Kan, 925 F. Supp. 1 (quoting
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989).
201 Id. at 4.
202 Id. at 19-20.
203 Id. at 20. The four-part O'Brien test is: (1) it is within
the court was "precluded from second guess-
ing."2 0 1 The government further contended that
the encryption program could not be viewed as
"convey[ing] a particularized message," and as
such the First Amendment claim must fail. 202 As-
suming that the conduct was "expressive con-
duct," which was afforded constitutional protec-
tion, the government argued that the O'Brien test
should be applied.203 In applying the O'Brien test,
the government argued that the disk was not reg-
ulated for its "informational or expressive value
... but because of its functional use." 2 0 4 The gov-
ernment asserted that the well-defined distinction
between the book and the computer disk, was in
its "function" or "the capability to provide to
whomever obtains it."205 Yet at the same time, in
what would appear to be a contradictory argu-
ment, the government concluded that the fact
that the encryption source codes may be scanned
onto a computer disk may "compel reconsidera-
tion of the status of the printed source codes
.... "206 It appears the government's attorneys ne-
glected to confer with the Director of FBI
Counter Intelligence before reaching this conclu-
sion.
On March 22, 1996, the court granted the De-
fendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in part
with respect to the plaintiffs First Amendment
claims. 2 07 The court held that the defendants
were not regulating the export of the disk because
of the "expressive content of the comments and
the constitutional power of the Government, (2) it furthers
an important or substantial government interest, (3) the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, (4) the incidental restriction on the alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
204 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, for
SummaryJudgment at 27, Kan, 925 F. Supp. 1.
205 Id. at 3.
206 Id. at 28. The government contended, due to the
lack of perfection of OCR technology, it did not yet produce
error-free reproductions. Any errors that were made would
necessitate the need for an individual with knowledge to
remedy the situation. In the case of a preprogrammed com-
puter disk, very little knowledge of the encryption technology
is needed. Concerning the technology of OCR, a recent
newspaper article reported that there are currently a number
of businesses in the Pacific Rim and other Asian countries
that specialize in scanning vast amounts of text onto com-
puters. See Sheppard, supra note 187.
207 Kan, 925 F. Supp. 1, appeal docketed, No. 96-5121
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 20, 1996).
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or source code, but instead are regulating [it] be-
cause of the belief that the combination of en-
cryption source code on machine readable media
will make it easier for foreign intelligence sources
to encode their communications."208 Therefore,
the court concluded that the regulation was "con-
tent neutral" and the O'Brien test should be ap-
plied.209 Relative to whether the regulation is
within the power of the government and whether
it furthers a significant governmental interest, the
court stated that it "will not scrutinize the President's
foreign policy decision" and the court 'neither has
the'aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility' to make
a judicial decision of this kind.210 The last test,
whether the regulation is "narrowly tailored to the
goal of limiting the proliferation of cryptographic
products," was dismissed by the court because of
the plaintiffs failure to "articulate any present
barrier to the spreading of information on cryp-
tography 'by any other means,' other than those
containing encryption source code on machine-
readable media."21 1 Interestingly enough, this
last argument addressed by the court is one of the
very issues in dispute in the next two cases.
B. Daniel Bernstein
I In 1992, Daniel Bernstein, then a graduate stu-
dent of the mathematics department at the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley, developed an en-
cryption algorithm named "Snuffle." 2 12 In an
effort to continue his research, Bernstein wished
to publish his discovery in a paper and a com-
puter program which implements the algorithm.
He also sought to post his encryption program
and related documents upon an Internet discus-
208 Id. at 10.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 11 (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines v.
Waterman SS. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (emphasis ad-
ded)).
211 Id. at 12.
212 Bicoastal Court Challenges: Tackling Export Controls on
Encryption, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at 2.
213 See ODTC Case: 191-92, Letter from Daniel Bernstein,
to Office of Defense Trade Controls, Department of State
(June 30, 1992). All documents related to Bernstein's re-
quests and subsequent litigation are at: (visited Jan. 25, 1997)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITAR-export/Bernstein
case/Legal/>.
214 ODTC Case: 191-92, Reply Letter from William Robin-
son, Director of Office of Defense Trade Controls, Depart-
ment of State, to Daniel Bernstein (Aug. 20, 1992).
215 Complaint at 17, Bernstein v. United States Dep't of
sion group called "sci.crypt." Aware of the export
restrictions, Bernstein filed a request with the
State Department so that he would be able to ex-
port his paper and computer disk. 213 The State
Department responded that he would need a li-
cense.214 However, in an attempt to allow the gov-
ernment to separately consider each item, Bern-
stein filed five separate requests with the State
Department.215 The State Department responded
by consolidating the items into one request and
summarily asserting that a license was needed. 2 1 6
The supporting rationale was that the "referenced
items contain cryptographic source code for data
encryption and are used in a stand-alone crypto-
graphic product."2 1 7
Two years later, on February 21, 1995, Bern-
stein brought suit against the federal government.
The complaint asserted that the export regula-
tions in question are "unlawful prior restraints
depriving them [Bernstein and other academics]
of their federal constitutional rights to speak, to
publish, to assemble, to receive information and
to engage in academic study, inquiry and publica-
tion, guaranteed by the First Amendment."218 In
particular, Bernstein argued that the three step li-
censing process and the approval process effec-
tively "prevents general publication."219 Bernstein
contended that as a student of science, the lack of
an exchange of information or ideas infringed on
his "right of academic freedom."2 20 He also ar-
gued that computer software is simply another
language and the Court should not allow the gov-
ernment "to force him [Bernstein] to publish it
only in the languages they [the government]
choose (English, as opposed to computer lan-
guages) "221
State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D.Cal. 1996); The five requests
included: (1) a scientific paper entitled "The Snuffle Encryp-
tion System;" (2) source code for the encryption component
of Snuffle; (3) source code for the decryption component of
Snuffle; (4) a description of how to encrypt using Snuffle; (5)
instructions for programming a computer.to use Snuffle. Id.
216 ODTC Case: 214-93, Reply Letter from William Robin-
son, Director of Office of Defense Trade Controls, Depart-
ment of State, to Daniel Bernstein (Oct. 5, 1993).
217 Id.
218 Complaint at 25, Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D.
Cal. 1996).
219 Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 9, Bern-
stein, 922 F. Supp. 1426.
220 Complaint at 43, Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. 1426.
221 Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 22,
Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. 1426.
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The government promptly filed a motion to dis-
miss where it was argued that the issue was the
"exportation of actual cryptographic software"
and not the "academic discussion about its under-
lying theory."222 It was contended that the source
code is not speech but simply "mathematical ideas
expressed in computer language." 223 The fact
that these ideas provide a recipient with all of the
necessary facilities to "function [ly]" encrypt data
makes them distinct from an explanation or dis-
cussion about the "science of cryptology." There-
fore, the government argues that the court may
not "second guess" the USML designation of cryp-
tographic software.2 24
On April of 1996, U.S. District Judge Marilyn
Hall Patel denied the government's motion to dis-
miss. 22 5 In dismissing the government's motion,
the court was the first court to ever hold that the
source code is protected as speech under the First
Amendment. It was asserted that there "was no
meaningful difference between computer lan-
guage. . .and German or French."226 Concerning
the functionality aspect of the source code, the
court held that it "does not remove it from the
realm of speech . . . [i]nstruction, do-it-yourself
manuals, recipes and even technical information
about hydrogen bomb construction . . . are often
purely functional: they are also speech."227 The
final outcome of this case has the opportunity of
establishing original precedent in an area that is,
as one former Justice Department official re-
marked, of "huge significance because the gov-
ernment's ability to police its borders for control
of export of high-tech munitions hangs in the bal-
222 Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Fur-
ther Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 11-12, Bern-
stein, 922 F. Supp. 1426.
223 Id. at 12.
224 Id. at 6.
225 Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. 1426.
226 Id. at 1435.
227 Id.
228 LEGAL TIMES, supra note 212.
229 Junger v. Christopher, (No. 96 CV 1723) (N.D. Ohio
Aug. 7, 1996). All documents and pleadings concerning this
case can be found at: (visited Jan. 25, 1997) <http://sam-
sara.1aw.cwru.edu/compiaw/jvc/index.html>.
230 Complaint at 2, Junger, (No. 96 CV 1723) (N.D. Ohio
filed Aug. 7, 1996).
231 Id. at 2-3.
232 Id. at 3.
233 Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 5, Junger, (No. 96 CV 1723) (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7,
1996). When Prof. Junger's attorney was questioned why his
client did not file a Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) Request to
ance." 2 28
C. Peter Junger
The third case to question the constitutionality
of the restrictions on the export of encryption was
filed by a law professor from Case Western Uni-
versity Law School by the name of PeterJunger. 2 2 9
The subject of the dispute revolves around Profes-
sor Junger's class entitled "Computers and the
Law." 230 In May 1993, Prof. Junger wrote an en-
cryption program that he wished to present to his
class. 23 1 Concerned of the implications of distrib-
uting the program and related information to for-
eign students, Prof. Junger contacted the Depart-
ment of Commerce, Department of State, the
ODTC and NSA in hopes of determining whether
his program was subject to export regulations.232
After numerous contacts with the various agen-
cies, he was unable to obtain a determinative an-
swer.23 3 Three years later, Prof. Junger filed a fed-
eral suit against the State Department and
National Security Agency.
Professor Junger's main contention is that the
"[ITAR] regulations are unconstitutional because
they constitute a blatant system of overbroad and
vague prior restraints that violate rights of aca-
demic freedoin of association."2 3 4 As a result of
the restrictions, Prof. Junger argues that he must
chose "between petitioning the government and
allowing foreign students in his class."2 35 It is fur-
ther asserted that the ITAR serves as a "prepubli-
cation licensing scheme" and as such, the law de-
mands that procedural safeguards be in place.2 36
obtain a definitive answer from the ODTC, he responded by
stating that it "would not be practical; because he has a lot of
information that he wishes to distribute . . . and he would
end up spending all of his time filling out CJ requests. In
addition, we don't have to get a permit to make a First
Amendment claim." Telephone Interview with Gino Scar-
selli, Attorney for ProfessorJunger (Oct. 10, 1996). It is fore-
seeable that the government may use this information to ar-
gue that Prof. Junger's claim is not ripe because no request
was ever made and as a result, there may be no issue to dis-
pute. As support for the government's contention the
Supreme Court has asserted that the "exhaustion doctrine
continues to apply as a matter of judicial discretion in cases
not governed by the APA." Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137,
153-54 (1993).
234 Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 11-12,Junger v. Christopher, (No. 96 CV 1723)
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 1996).
235 Id. at 13-14.




Another key argument raised in the brief is that
First Amendment protection should be afforded
to Prof. Junger's program because "even execut-
able programs in machine code, are afforded
copyright protection."2 3 7 Undoubtedly, this argu-
ment was based in part on the fact that Judge
Patel in the Bernstein litigation had subscribed to
the same reasoning when she asserted that "the
expression of an idea" is afforded copyright pro-
tection. 2 3 8 Therefore, Judge Patel reasoned that
"[a]n encryption program expressed in source
code communicates to other programmers and
ultimately to the computer itself how to make the
encryption algorithm (the idea) functional" and
as a result, "copyright law does lend support to
the conclusion that source code is a means of
original expression. "2 39
In the Junger case, the government reaffirms its
argument that the "controls are expressly linked
to the capability of the product, not the content of
ideas or speech."2 4 0 As a result, the government
contends that the court should examine the regu-
lations as content neutral.24 ' However, one can
infer quite the contrary, when the government,
several paragraphs later, states the purpose of the
export controls is to limit the spread of a product
that can encrypt data. 2 4 2
The government also asserts that the "broad
public exchange of information . . . [through]
[a]cadmeic teaching, publication, research and
symposia" serves as evidence that the government
is not interested in the spread of ideas at home,
but at the spread of encryption software over-
seas. 2 4 3 In regards to the software itself, the gov-
ernment contends that it "is not merely 'know
how' that explains how cryptography works, or a
description of scientific ideas or information re-
lated to cryptography." 2 4 4 Rather, the govern-
237 Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 18-19, Junger, (No. 96 CV 1723) (N.D. Ohio
Aug. 7, 1996).
238 Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F.
Supp. 1426, 1436 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
239 Id.
240 Defendants Memorandum of Point and Authorities
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunc-
tion and in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in
the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 19, Junger v.
Christopher, (No. 96 CV 1723) (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 1996)
(emphasis added).
241 Id. at n.24. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622 (1994); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 810 (1984).
242 Defendant's Memorandum supra note 240, at 20.
ment asserts that the software "enables a com-
puter to perform a cryptographic function" and
the regulation therefore only goes to the "func-
tionality" of the software. 2 4 5
Even with the recent announcement of the
Clipper III initiative and the transfer of export
control over to the Commerce Department, these
three cases still present First Amendment issues
that remain unresolved. Until such time that the
administration or the courts recognize that en-
cryption is speech and afford it speech status with
the appropriate First Amendment protections,
these cases represent the only hope for the future
of encryption-speech.
V. ANALYSIS OF FIRST AMENDMENT
IMPLICATIONS
Regardless of the outcome and implementation
of the Clipper III initiative, it can be argued the
government has failed to recognize that source
code is speech and should be afforded the first
amendment protections. As a result, the ongoing
litigation of the three aforementioned cases are
necessary in order to confront the administra-
tion's attempt to window-dress key escrow as key
recovery. Only after source code has been held to
be speech will the future forms and mediums of
communication be protected. The next section
will present an analysis of the constitutional issues
and questions raised by recognizing that encryp-
tion and specifically, source code is speech under
the First Amendment.
A. Source Code is Speech
As previously discussed, source code is used in
the process of encrypting and decrypting commu-
This statement seems to suggest that, in reality, the govern-
ment's desire to control the "spreading" of a product that has
the capability to encrypt, is in actuality an agenda to control
the content of the program that allows the product to per-
form the task. Therefore, the government's contention that
the regulation is content neutral is a misplaced attempt to
force the court to examine the form and not the substance of
the encryption product.
243 Id. at 13.
244 Id. at 22.
245 Id. at 22-23. The government's assertion, by singly
concentrating on one character of the software, blindly ig-
nores all of the other different aspects of the software. It
should be noted that all of these additional qualities that the




nication. In order to determine if source code is
protected under the First Amendment, it must
first be determined whether source code is speech
within a first amendment context.246 From its in-
ception to present day, the First Amendment has
been applied to a variety of different mediums.
Newspapers, leaflets, pamphlets, films, and broad-
casting have all been recognized by the Supreme
Court as qualifying for first amendment protec-
tion. 247 In analyzing the many different mediums,
the Court has held that, "[t] he press in its historic
connotation comprehends every sort of publica-
tion which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion."248 The freedom to express one's ideas
has long been recognized as one of the founding
principles for the existence of the First Amend-
ment.2 49 This "marketplace of ideas" allows for
the scholarly exchange of beliefs and ideas to sep-
arate the truth from the falsity. The Court recog-
nized that academics serve an instrumental role in
this process when it stated that, " [t] o impose any
strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our
colleges and universities would imperil the future
of our Nation."25 0
Cryptography is a recognized science of mathe-
matics that is taught at many educational institu-
tions throughout the country. It is the science of
using mathematical equations to create another
form of communication, namely algorithms. A
counter argument often asserted is that cryptogra-
phy is not speech, because it provides a "function"
and does not "convey a particularized mes-
246 Although neither Karn nor Bernstein reached a final
disposition, each have arrived at a different conclusion re-
garding this issue.
247 CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)
(broadcasting); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952) (motion pictures); United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (motion pictures, newspa-
pers, radio); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
(pamphlets and leaflets).
248 Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452.
249 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 625 (1919)
(Holmes J., dissenting).
250 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)
(noting the importance of protecting scholarship and aca-
demic inquiry); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
762-63 (1972) (recognizing that the First Amendment pro-
tects the right to receive information and ideas).
251 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
252 Compare United States v. Progressive Inc., 467 F.
Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (holding that prior restraint was
allowed on technical information about hydrogen bomb con-
struction).
253 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v.
Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S.
sage. "251 However, it should be argued that en-
cryption algorithms are no different from a chem-
ical equation, genetic code or even a nuclear
fission equation.252 All of these particular sub-
jects would most likely be unintelligible to those
that are not completely familiar with them, but
that in itself does not strip them of any character-
istics of protected speech.
Source code can also be compared to the pro-
tection afforded foreign languages. The Supreme
Court has held that the First Amendment prohib-
its the government from restricting languages
taught or used.25 3 In Yniguez, the Court stated
that "[s]peech in any language is still speech
.... "254 Therefore, the use of the computer lan-
guage as a form of expression of ideas and infor-
mation should be afforded the First Amendment
protection that every other "foreign" language is
afforded.
B. Government's Argument for Expressive
Conduct
The government has also advanced the argu-
ment that source code is not speech but rather
"expressive conduct."25 5 The contention is that
the algorithm contains non-speech elements
which are combined with incidental speech ele-
ments and as such, a different test, the O'Brien
test, should be applied.256 This argument was rec-
ognized as flawed in Yniguez, where the court as-
500 (1926); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
254 Yniguez v. Arizonans, 69 F.3d 920, 936 (9th. Cir.
1995), cert granted 116 S.Ct. 2495 (1996).
255 Id. supra note 204, at 20.
256 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment at 27, Karn v. United States Dep't of
State, 925 F. Supp 1, (D.C. Cir. 1996) (laying out the test).
The government has also argued that a First Amendment at-
,tack is precluded based upon a 9th Circuit decision. Defend-
ant's Memorandum of Point and Authorities in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Summary judgement at 7, Bernstein
v. United States Dept' of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (citing United States v. Edler Indus., 579 F.2d 516 (9th
Cir. 1978)). The Bernstein court dismissed the defendant's
argument "that if Edler allows the government to legitimately
restrict the export of technical data relating to a defense arti-
cle, it can certainly restrict the defense article itself." Bern-
stein, 922 F. Supp. at 1437. The court reasoned that the de-
fendant's argument was an extension of the of the Edler
decision that the court was "unwilling to adopt" based on the
fact that the "validity of the scope of the munitions list was
simply not an issue in that case." Id.
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serted that all speech has elements of expressive
conduct.
speech in any language consists of the 'expres-
sive conduct' of vibrating one's vocal chords, mov-
ing one's mouth and thereby making sounds, or
of putting pen to paper, or hand to keyboard. Yet
the fact that such 'conduct' is shaped by a lan-
guage - that is, a sophisticated and complex sys-
tem of understood meanings - is what makes it
speech. Language is by definition speech, and
the regulation of any language is the regulation of
speech.257
However, if the court should accept the argu-
ment that source code is not speech but rather
only expressive conduct, then the court must ap-
ply the O'Brien test. The first prong of the four
part test is whether the government's interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion. 2 5 8 One government argument advanced is
that their interest is only the "functional use" and
not the scientific ideas. Applying this reasoning,
the government argues that a book containing the
same information as a computer disk is not as
functional. This argument fails to' acknowledge
that the functionality of something is based upon
the knowledge of the reader. For instance, if a
graduate student studying cryptography at a uni-
versity in Berkeley received a copy of an algorithm
in a textual format, its functional value would be
identical to the same information in a computer
format. The same analogy can be applied to any
other subject of information. If a political scien-
tist received statistical information in textual for-
mat, its functional value would be identical to the
same information compiled on a computer disk.
For one with a limited knowledge of a subject,
the different formats, in either a book or com-
puter disk, would make absolutely no difference
to their functional values. It is argued that if an
individual without the requisite knowledge comes
across a problem while utilizing the textual format
of the source code, it will be more of a formidable
task to remedy the situation, compared to the lim-
257 Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934-35.
258 O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
259 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 390 (1923).
260 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
261 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment at 21, Karn v. United States Dep't of
State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
262 Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Fur-
ther Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 12, Bern-
ited knowledge necessary to operate the com-
puter format. Therefore, the government's inter-
est in preventing the "functional use" is literally a
government interest in preventing the advantages
of the information from being readily available in
a format where an understanding of the informa-
tion is not necessary. Limiting the extent of
broadening one's knowledge has been held by the
Supreme Court as "inconceivable" to "serv[ing]
the public welfare or add[ing] substantially to the
security of life, liberty or the pursuit of happi-
ness."25 9 The government's reasoning can not be
supported and the only rational government in-
terest is the suppression of free expression. As a
result, the government fails the O'Brien test.
If the court should nevertheless accept that the
government's interest as unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression, the government must still
meet the second prong of the O'Brien test, which
states that the regulation must further an impor-
tant or substantial governmental interest. 26 0 The
government has asserted that its interest is in
"protect[ing] critical foreign intelligence gather-
ing functions"26' and "controll[ing] the foreign
availability of a commodity that can . . . en-
crypt."2 6 2 The government has based its conclu-
sion upon information from NSA, which asserts
that, "the proliferation of such products will make
it easier for foreign intelligence targets to deny
the United States access to information vital to na-
tional security interests."26s The courts have also
held "that no government interest is more com-
pelling than the security of the Nation."2 6 4
It should be argued that in order to conduct a
proper analysis of this prong of the O'Brien test,
the arguments advanced by the government, one
must focus on the word "furthers." The govern-
ment alleges that controlling the increase of en-
cryption is art important interest; yet the existence
of hundreds of encryption products in foreign
countries has not brought about any modifica-
tions to the U.S. domestic encryption policy. This
approach has created a process where foreign cor-
stein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426
(N.D.Cal. 1996).
263 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note
261, at 23.
264 Haig v. Agree, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (upholding
passport revocation over a first amendment challenge); but
cf United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (holding
that "even the war power does not remove constitutional lim-
itations safeguarding individual liberties").
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porations are supplying the U.S. domestic market
with encryption products. In fact, the number of
foreign distributors has steadily increased and is
expected to continue to rise if export regulations
remain in place. 265 Therefore, it can be con-
cluded that the export regulations do not control
the proliferation or availability of encryption
products, rather the regulations serve to deny
only U.S. corporations wishing to distribute en-
cryption products access to the worldwide market.
As a result, the government argument should fail
the second prong of the O'Brien test.
If the court should nevertheless accept that the
government regulation does further an important
or substantial interest, the government must still
meet the third prong of the O'Brien test, which
states that the "incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedom [s] is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest."266
The government asserts that this element is satis-
fied because the export of the software does not
"preclude individuals from otherwise publishing
or discussing scientific ideas related to . . . crypto-
graphic algorithms."2 67  However, the govern-
ment does point out that the distribution of en-
cryption on the Internet without "reasonable
steps to confine the distribution of software to In-
ternet sites within the United States" will result in
a violation of the law.268 As stated earlier, the gov-
ernment's only concern is with the functionality
of the source code and not the scientific ideas.
Therefore, the government contends that "ample
alternative channels of communication" remain
available. 269 The government also contends that
cryptographic software that does not function to
maintain secrecy, an example being software that
265 David Judson, Senators Want to Open Export Market for
Security Software, GANNETT NEWS SERv., Mar. 5, 1996, at 1.
266 O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
267 Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities
In Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or In the Alter-
native, For Summary Judgment at 33, Karn v. United States
Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
268 Defendants Memorandum of Point and Authorities
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunc-
tion and in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in
the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 33, Junger v.
Christopher, No. 96 CV 1723 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 1996). The
brief relies on the Declaration of WilliamJ. Lowell, the Direc-
tor of the Office of Defense Trade Controls, Bureau of Polit-
ical-Military Affairs, United States Department of State. It is
important to note that the brief does not suggest what those
"reasonable steps" are.
269 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802
functions to authenticate data, is not encom-
passed in the strict export regulations. 270
It can be argued that the regulations do not
provide for ample alternative channels for the
communication of cryptographic subjects. The
limitation of distribution on the Internet because
the government believes that "making software
available abroad has nothing to do with teaching
a class" 271 is a grave misconception. In order for
any theory to be properly tested, one must be af-
forded the opportunity to confirm his or her hy-
pothesis. The hypothesis in the study of cryptog-
raphy is that the source code, which is the heart of
any algorithm, is effective at maintaining the in-
tegrity of the confidentiality of a communication.
In order for this hypothesis to be effectively
tested, one must be able to use the tools, the only
tools which will allow the tests to be performed.
The courts have held that the alternatives must be
"sufficiently similar to the method foreclosed by
the regulation." 2 7 2 The hypothesis must be scruti-
nized by many within the academic community
before the hypothesis is considered factual and
worthy of application. When the ability to effec-
tively communicate is threatened, the regulation
may be constitutionally inadequate.275 The gov-
ernment's quashing of any substantive formula-
tion of hypothesis, in effect, destroys the entire
science of cryptography. As result, the govern-
ment's policy is saying that you can study cryptog-
raphy all you want, just don't produce any results.
Therefore, based on the fact that the regulations
remove ample alternatives to the study of cryptog-
raphy, the government's arguments fail the third
prong of the O'Brien test.
The fourth element of the O'Bien test whether
(1989). The government has consistently argued that nu-
merous channels currently exist. The existence of "courses
on cryptography . . . routinely taught at dozens of colleges
and universities . . . and several textbooks on cryptography
[which] have been published over the years" serve as support
for their assertion. Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Mo-
tion for a Preliminary Injunction at 12, Bernstein v. United
States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
270 See 22 C.F.R. § 167 (1996); 22 C.F.R. § 121.1
XIII(b)(1)(vi) (1996).
271 Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 1, Bernstein v. United States Dept of
State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
272 Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42
F.3d 181, 203 (4th. Cir. 1994) vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 116 S.Ct. 1036 (1996).




the regulation is within the constitutional power
does not warrant any deliberation. 274 The Arms
Control Export Act (ACEA) 275 and the Interna-
tional Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 2 7 6
clearly establishes that the President has been del-
egated the authority under the law2 7 7 and the Ex-
port Administration Act (EAA) establishes that
the Secretary has authority under the law.2 78
Therefore, the ITAR regulations and EAA regu-
lations that govern the export of encryption
software, specifically source code, should be not
be examined as governing "expressive conduct"
based on the fact that the regulations do not meet
three of the four prongs of the O'Brien test. As a
result, source code should be analyzed as speech.
C. The Constitutionality of Regulating Source
Code as Speech
Once it has been determined that source code
is speech, the next analysis demands a determina-
tion whether the restriction is content-based or a
time, place and manner restriction. A time, place
or manner restriction may not have any reference
to the content of the speech or stated by the
courts is content neutral.279 The standard for a
time, place or manner restriction has been recog-
nized by the court in Community for Creative Non-
Violence, as being very similar in nature to the
O'Brien test.28 0 Therefore, based upon the earlier
conclusions of the O'Brien tests, if the restrictions
were found to be content neutral they would fail a
time, place or manner test.
A content-based restriction relates to whether
the application of the restriction turns on the sub-
stance or content of the speech. 281 The govern-
274 See O'Brien test, supra note 203.
275 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994).
276 22 C.F.R. § 120 (1996).
277 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (1) (1994).
278 50 U.S.C.S. § 2409(a) (1) (1996)
279 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989).
280 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 298 (1984) (noting that the O'Brien test differs little
from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restric-
tions).
281 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 754 (1990)
(Brennan J., dissenting).
282 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
283 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
284 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
285 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
ment regulation must be concerned with the com-
municative impact of the alleged "substantive
evil." 2 8 2 In the Karn, Bernstein and Junger, the gov-
ernment's interest is focused upon the ability of
the recipient of the encryption source code to al-
ter plaintext to ciphertext. This governmental in-
terest is clearly a content-based regulation. The
Court has held that content-based restriction "will
be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a
compelling governmental interest."28 3 Therefore,
a regulation pertaining to a listener's or a reader's
behavior from the communicative impact of the
speech, receives a standard of review of the "most
exacting scrutiny."2 8 4
A content-based restriction that is based upon a
governmental licensing scheme is a form of prior
restraint.28 5 The ITAR regulations that govern
the export of encryption software serves to pre-
vent publication of encryption source code, which
refers to a particular part of a computer language.
The EAA also establishes a licensing scheme
which restricts the export of items that do not
meet particular requirements. The source code
may be published when governmental approval is
granted and a license is issued.286 Governmental
licensing comes with a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity.2 8 7 The court established
in New York Times, that the "disclosure . . . will
surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable
damage to out Nation or its people."28 8 A restric-
tion of this type will not be upheld if based solely
upon an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension
of disturbance."28 9 The measuring stick that all
content prior restraint cases are evaluated against
is whether the speech presents a danger equal to
"publication of sailing dates of transports or
(1971) (per curiam).
286 The proces that an encryption export application
goes through isrfurther support that the regulation is con-
tent-based. As each license application is reviewed by NSA
and other relevant agencies, they review the "content of the
software to determine whether it is harmless . . . or danger-
ous . . . and "the decision hinges entirely on what the re-
viewer concludes about the content of the speech." Appeal
Brief of the Appellant at 31, Karn v. United States Dep't of
State, appeal docketed, No. 96-5121 (D.C. Cir. Sep. 20, 1996).
287 Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Town of Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968).
288 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart J., concur-
ring).
289 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971) (quoting




number and location of troops."290
The arguments advanced by the government in
the Karn case suggest that the restriction is based
only upon a speculative fear. The assertion that
Mr. Karn's book "can be expected to result in far
more actual use of encryption overseas, and
thereby complicate even more the signals intelli-
gence mission of the United States" is based on
two assumptions.29 ' The first assumption is that
actual use of encryption overseas will not increase
without the export of U.S. encryption products.
As advanced earlier, the number of foreign read-
ily available encryption software products have
risen sieadily and appear to be unaffected by the
restrictions in the United States. The second as-
sumption is that government's efforts will be fur-
ther complicated by an increase in encryption
use. As of late 1994, the FBI was unable to point
to a single case where encryption had hampered
an investigation.29 2 The assumption is also based
on the conclusion that the law enforcement's
technology will not advance in step with the crimi-
nal technology. A former General Counsel for
NSA recently acknowledged that there were few
institutions other then the government that had
the energy and resources to make efficient en-
cryption software and products.2"3 With the capa-
bilities and resources of no other private institu-
tion, it is highly unlikely that the government's
efforts will be complicated now or in the forsee-
able future.
Therefore, based on the fact that the govern-
ment's rationale for the licensing of encryption
software for export is founded purely on an undif-
ferentiated fear, this form of prior restraint must
be found unconstitutional.
VI. ONE POSSIBLE WAY TO DEAL WITH
THE CRYPTO-GENIE
There is no denying the fact that the Crypto-
genie is out of the bottle and flourishing through-
out the world. The U.S. government's attempts,
up to this point, have fallen short. A quasi-
mandatory program implemented on the In-
ternet, a worldwide network with no central inter-
face, is doomed to a certain failure. But, by the
same token, a completely unguided and unregu-
lated encryption policy is just as short-sighted.
The interests of law enforcement are tanta-
mount to the survival of any society. The poten-
tial for injury has only increased with the emer-
gence and growth of computer technology. What
was impossible to steal a few years ago, is now
feasable with just a keystroke. Within a blink of
an eye, a file cabinet worth of national security in-
formation is in the hands of an adversary. How-
ever, the effectiveness of law enforcement's efforts
should not be based upon the yielding of one's
individual rights. If law enforcement was not re-
strained to abide by one's personal rights, then
practices such as warrantless searches and non-evi-
dentiary hearings would be routine. This would
undoubtedly bring about more "effective" law en-
forcement, but also at an enormous cost.
The solution must come in incremental stages
to ensure success. The U.S. Government must re-
alize that in order for any long term encryption
policy to be successful, it must advance proposals
that recognize the structure of the Internet. At-
tempts to govern the Internet through multina-
tional agreements are inappropriate.294 The In-
ternet does not recognize borders or countries.
290 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (holding
that the danger of war allows for limitations upon certain
content of speech).
291 Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Defend-
ants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment at 6, Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F.
Supp. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
292 Hoffman, supra note 6, at 5.1.
293 Stuart Baker, General Counsel of NSA, Remarks at
the Fourth Annual Conference on Computers, Freedom and
Privacy, session entitled "Data Encryption: Who Holds the
Keys?" at the John Marshall Law School, Chicago (Mar. 24,
1994) (visited Jan. 25, 1997) <http://www.cpsr.org/dox/con-
ferences/cfp94/encpanel.html/>.
294 Ineffective, as well as not in a particular country's
best interest. A recent example in France serves as an ample
warning. During the administration of Francois Mitterrand,
over 1,500 people were illegally wiretapped. Yves LeRoux,
Representative from French Office of Digital Equipment, Re-
marks at the Annual International Cryptography Institute
Conference (Oct. 26, 1996). Some of the illegal wiretaps in-
cluded Edqy Plenel, a journalist who broke the story that
French agents were responsible for the bombing of the
Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior in New Zealand in 1986.
Another unsuspecting individual was Franois Froment-
Meurice, the deputy leader of the opposition party. See Dave
Banisar, French Wiretapping Scandal Leads 4o Electorial Defeat,




Therefore, unless every country that has access to
the Internet is able to agree upon the standards,
the U.S. government must advocate a predomi-
nately domestic agenda with regards to control-
ling the ill effects of encryption.
The first stage is to establish a truly voluntary key
escrow system with limited governmental involve-
ment. The finite governmental involvement
should be in the form of advocating the establish-
ment of standards and nothing else. This open-
ended program will allow for the encryption in-
dustry to explore a variety of different concepts
and eventually produce encryption systems that
will be compatible with any type of product. Un-
doubtedly, the business community will be more
receptive to the products because of the unintru-
sive nature of governmental involvement and the
ease of compatibility promises the least amount of
lost revenue. As a result, as the business commu-
nity embraces the open-ended encryption prod-
ucts, individuals within society will have no choice
but to accept what the market has produced. This
will also be extremely advantageous to the law en-
forcement community since it will not need to un-
derstand a number of different systems and prod-
ucts.
At first blush, this proposal may appear to be
quite similar to the current initiative proposed by
the White House. However, it is in fact, quite dis-
similar. First, research and development would
be conducted completely independent of govern-
mental control. This would allow for industry to
focus its efforts and precious resources on estab-
lishing a secure form of communication, instead
of focusing on the development of a key recovery
system that allows government to have access com-
munications. Second, would be the sizable differ-
ence in the rate of penetration of encryption tech-
nology absent governmental involvement. Based
in part on some of the aforementioned incidents
involving governmental abuse, the general public
is quite suspicious of programs that involve the
government and "national security." Governmen-
tal involvement, through programs like key es-
crow or key recovery, as stated by the National Re-
295 National Research Council, Report on Cryptography's
Role in Securing the Information Society, (Pre-publication copy,
Nat'l. Acad. Press 1996).
296 Michael Johnson, Data Encryption Software and Techni-
cal Data Controls in the United States of America (visited Jan. 25,
1997) <http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITARtexport/us_
crypto-policy.faq>.
search Council, "[are] not appropriate at this
time" and "[are] likely to have a significant impact
on the natural development of applications." 2 9 5
Lastly, from a strictly policy perspective, advocat-
ing the control of society's technology when the
capabilities of law enforcement are limited as a re-
sult of its growth is simply unwarranted. One of
law enforcement's primary responsibilities is to
keep up with the criminal element in our society,
and this should not be achieved by expecting the
rest of society to become technologically stagnant.
At this point, it is critical to emphasize that it is
absolutely fundamental that law enforcement con-
tinues to use all of its available resources to neu-
tralize criminal activities. These resources can
come in the form of continued research and im-
provement of encryption capabilities or the im-
provement of other areas of intelligence methods.
Long-range bugging devices, satellite imaging and
relay devices are only a few of the devices that pro-
vide some of the same information, without the
enormous costs upon one's individual rights. 296 It
has also long been recognized that signal intelli-
gence, who talks to whom, is in itself of significant
value.2 9 7 The capabilities of existing technolo-
gies, integrated services digital network (ISDN),
provides information about who called whom,
when and how long the communication took
place.29 8 Therefore, just as we should, not be
asked to use weaker locks on our doors, we should
not be expected to use weaker encryption on our
communications.
Stage two will comprise the development of a
law enforcement structure to effectively combat
criminal aspects of our society that utilize encryp-
tion but preserving the rights afforded by the First
Amendment.
A possible remedy to the Crypto-genie is deal-
ing with it in the same manner law enforcement
currently deals with obtaining a warrant for a
wiretap or searching one's house. In the case of
an encrypted computer communication, the of-
ficer would obtain independent evidence that par-
ticular conversations between two parties were of
a criminal nature. Upon court authorization, the
297 Peter Coffee, Privacy Defies Digital Designers, PC WK.,
July 3, 1995, at 56.
298 See generally, The Administration's Clipper Chip Key
Escrow Encryption Program: Hearings on S. J-103-55, Before
the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law at 40, 103rd
Cong., (1994) (statement of Dr. Whitfield).
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officer would be granted permission to super en-
crypt or encrypt on top any messages between the
two alleged parties. The super encryption would
cause the message to be unreadable by the either
party of the communication. Either party to the
communication would then be given the opportu-
nity to contest the seizure within a prescribed pe-
riod of time. If the seizure is contested, the party
to the communication would have to prove by a
minimal standard that the communication was
not of a criminal nature. The procedure could be
done in camera, to protect any privacy concerns.
Should the moving party be unable to meet his or
her burden, the officer would be able to use any
and all available means to decrypt the communi-
cation. This procedure would allow parties to
communicate without the fear that any particular
message could be intercepted and read without
any notice and opportunity of a hearing.
Unfortunately, this recommendation does suf-
fer from the inability of providing law enforce-
ment with "real-time" access. However, the utiliza-
tion of doors, locks and alarm systems have also
contributed to law enforcement's inability to have
"real-time" access, but we have not limited how so-
ciety may utilize these devices to protect their
rights. Further, to rely upon a certification sys-
tem, as proposed by the government, demands
that some degree of centralization to exist on the
Internet, which will inevitably lead to abuse.299
This approach serves as a realistic solution to a
problem that can never be totally controlled.
New and innovative technology is developed eve-
ryday which will restructure this debate for many
years to come. An example is a software product
called Power One-Time Pad (POTP), which pro-
vides for encryption without the use of any
keys.300 It synchronizes random processes on two
computers as they communicate. Each sequence
of communication is encrypted with a different
set of random processes. This system also
removes any need for knowledge of another's
keys. However, as stated a number of times
before, this product like so many other new prod-
ucts because of its high key bit length, is in viola-
tion of export regulations and as a result this tech-
nology will be kept from the public. This
products serve as only one example of how tech-
nology dictates the policy concerning cryptogra-
phy. In conclusion, one can only hope that the
debate will continually be guided by the words of
Justice Brandeis who stated that, " [t] he right to be
left alone - the most comprehensive of rights
and the most valued by civilized men."o3 0
299 SeeJohn Gilmore, Clipper III Analysis (visited Jan. 25,
1997) <http://www.crypto.com/eff.html>.
00 Winn Schwartau, Network Security Without Keys, NET-
WORK WORLD, Oct. 16, 1995, at 53.
01 Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 374 n. 64 (9th
Cir. 1968) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Ironically, in the Olm-
stead decision the Supreme Court held that wiretapping evi-
dence did not need court authorization; I would like to ex-
tend my deepest gratitude to the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, Ms. Cindy Cohn and Daniel Bernstein for af-
fording me the opportunity to work along side them as part
of the litigation team. The insight and knowledge that it af-
forded me allowed me to construct a more valuable work.
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